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Abstract 
This is a theoretical work which provides the first original attempt to develop a 
two-market model to characterized subsidized housing under the simple competitive 
search framework. Competitive search framework is adopted in this paper, because the 
framework properly captures the specific feature of free flowing buyers between the 
subsidized housing and its comparable counterparts in housing market. The framework 
per se allows the particular seller types to freely enter the corresponding market and the 
buyers can freely flow in between markets. Since both markets are competing with each 
other, any social housing policy would in return affect the private property market. 
In the midst of the model assumptions - (1) price bargaining and endogenously 
determined market tightness (2) with free entry of sellers' side as well as (3) the free flow 
of buyers in between the markets, this paper endeavors to shed the light on several 
essential policy implications in the public housing planning: The impact of public 
housing quantities and quality on the private real estate sector. 
Intuitively, if government provides a large quantity of public housing, buyers in the 
private sector with relatively higher market tightness will prefer to move from the 
overcrowded marketplace to the less crowded public housing sector. The nature of 
competitive market in housing sector allows buyers to choose either market as a 
substitute to its counterpart. The competition between two markets would lead to a 
tremendous plummet in price. Furthermore, the higher quality of public housing also 
intensifies the competition between both housing types which lead to a price drop in short 
run. Search cost (negatively) and bargaining power (positively) would affect the market 
tightness of private housing market and hence the market price of the properties. In this 
paper, author also borrows the 85,000 housing policy and housing quality improvement 
campaign in Hong Kong to illustrate how the model explains the reality. That also further 
gives a clear picture of how public and private housing markets interacted with each other 
in many well developed countries. 
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1. Introduction 
Endeavor to get everyone ensconced is vital to the well-being of a society and such 
notion of providing adequate satisfactory housing is therefore undoubtedly the primary 
obligation for every responsible government. To fulfill this primary obligation, many 
governments nowadays attempt to support their people with affordable housing in terms 
of various housing subsidies. For instance, in United States, financial assistance is 
provided for homeowners through the mortgage interest tax deduction. Furthermore, the 
eligible low-income families and individuals in the States under the Housing Choice 
Voucher Program can also receive in-kind subsidies provided by the Federal Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The voucher may be either in 
"project-based", where its use is limited to a specific apartment complex; or in 
"tenant-based", where the tenant is free to choose a unit in the private sector at an 
affordable leasing. 
Such similar subsidized housing programs can also be easily found amongst the Asian 
economies, say mainland China, Hong Kong, and Singapore, with different extent of its 
maturity. Simply take the subsidized housing in Singapore as an example; it is managed 
by the Housing and Development Board (HDB). The Board builds and maintains houses 
commonly known as HDB flats. The majority, around 85%, of Singaporeans live in these 
HDB flats which can be purchased with the financial aid offered by the Central Provident 
Fund. Most HDB flats are located in housing estates, which are comparable to the private 
housing counterparts. All these HDB flats are self-contained satellite towns in which 
schools, supermarkets, clinics, and recreational facilities are fully provided. Property 
prices for the public housing can often be similar to or even higher than those of privately 
developed properties. 
In Hong Kong, the resembling subsidized housing program is known as Home 
Ownership Scheme (HOS). The program per se is designed to assist the local residents to 
buy their own houses. As the focus of this paper, you may infer in between the lines of 
content, author tries to base on the housing market in Hong Kong for developing a 
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two-market model in which the model can characterize some of the features for 
subsidized housing program under the simple competitive search framework. Everyone 
will agree theories are the simplified abstraction of the reality, and therefore you will see 
some of the model assumptions in this paper are made in line with the Hong Kong 
situations, or otherwise there will be no starting point to build up the model. To simplify 
the analysis, our model will focus on the interactions between two submarkets, while the 
results can be possibly applied to the similar adjacent submarkets with further modified 
assumptions. 
The HOS flats and median class private housings' are here in Hong Kong formed two 
adjacent submarkets which accounted for almost half of the domestic residential housing 
transactions on average. Transactions in both markets are actively taking place inside the 
whole housing market and their potential buyers are basically the same group of people. 
Studying the eligibility criteria for "White Form" applicants under the Home Ownership 
Scheme delivered by the Hong Kong Housing Authority, we may infer that the two 
submarkets are highly comparable. The criteria stated that the families living in private 
sector housing can also be a type of potential applicants under the Scheme. The 
restrictions of asset limit are more or less the same as a common private sector 
household.2 Hence, we can see, in fact, there is a close interaction existing in between 
the two sectors. 
‘ H O S flats and median class private housings are defined the properties which are priced less than 3 
millions 
2 The total monthly family income does not exceed $10,000 per month (single person household) or 
$20,000 (2-person or above household) and the total net family asset does not exceed $240,000 (single 
person household) and $480,000 (2-person or above household), whereas the larger households will be 
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Figure 1 - Number of transactions of private properties (by price) 
Hong Kong situation is chosen to study with reasons. First, the subsidized housing in 
Hong Kong encompasses a well established institution. We can observe there is also a 
similar subsidized housing program in Mainland China, namely Economically Affordable 
Housing program, but the mechanism is not yet to be such mature. Second, the size of 
subsidized housing stock in Hong Kong accounted for a fairly significant amount of 
supply which is comparable to the private housing units with the similar price in the 
market. Therefore, the effect of any subsidized housing policy would exert an obvious 
impact in return onto the private housing market. 
In next section, author firstly makes the overview of the Hong Kong housing market and 
then summarizes several stylized facts to justify some of the assumptions in the model. 
With section followed, literature review is provided. After the model setup, some of the 
discussions and policy implications will be drawn as the conclusion of this paper. 
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2. HOS and the Comparable Private Housing Market 
To justify the two-market competitive search model in this paper, in this section we will 
start with the discussion on the development of housing market in Hong Kong. With the 
illustration of the relevant statistics, author aims at giving a clear picture for the readers 
about the current subsidized housing program in Hong Kong and hence legitimatizing the 
findings of the model in the paper. 
2.1. History and Policies in Hong Kong Housing Market 
The current housing market in Hong Kong is shaped by a series of policies implemented 
throughout the past five decades. With the commencement of the massive public housing 
policy in the early 50s, public housing continued to provide accommodation to the 
significant proportion of population in Hong Kong. Until nowadays, there is still an 
obvious expansion of the local public housing sector. The history of public housing sector 
can be traced back to the time of mid-50s, when the political upheaval in Mainland 
triggered a massive of refugees immigrate into the territory and therefore the number of 
squatters increased drastically at that time. The need of housing echoed in the society. In 
1953，a fire swept through the Shek Kip Mei Squatter area in Kowloon, rendering more 
than 50,000 people homeless overnight and hence accelerated the Government to 
implement the mass public housing program. The main objective of the program is to 
provide affordable housing for the low income group. Since government embarked on the 
mass public housing initiative to resettle squatters in public rental housing, the program 
gives out around 250,000 people a public housing within a decade, and by 1971 the 
resettlement estates housed a third of Hong Kong's population. 
In the 1960s, the government extended the scope of public rental housing and began to 
provide housing to lower-income private tenants as well. In the mid-1970s, it expanded 
its activities by further providing subsidized build-for-sale units, the Home Ownership 
Scheme (HOS). These units were available to settle both public tenants and means-tested 
private tenants. Although the HOS started on a small scale, it now accounts for about 25 
per cent of Hong Kong's total public housing. Because of the impressive achievements, 
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public housing ingrained the acceptance in the public and became effectively dominate 
the housing market in Hong Kong in the early 80s. The influence of public housing on 
private real estate market in Hong Kong has featured prominently in housing policy 
debates over the decades and culminated in the government's Long Term Housing 
Strategy (LTHS) in 1987. The LTHS outlined the intention to privatize public housing in 
several important respects. 
Implementation of the LTHS aimed at reducing the scale of public rental housing and in 
favor of various loan schemes and tenant purchasing program as the major vehicles to 
meet the housing demand. By gradually transformed the direct provision of housing units 
to subsidized housing consumption, the government of Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region has announced a range of important housing reforms after the 
handover of 1997. Three major initiatives including the (i) Home Ownership Scheme, (ii) 
Tenant Purchase Scheme, and (iii) Home Purchase Loan Scheme^ which intended to 
form an emerging public housing market for targeting 70 per cent of total population 
possess their home ownership by 2007 (compared to 54 per cent in 2000). 
By examining the distribution of population according to the type of housing in Hong 
Kong, until the first quarter of 2007 over 3.4 million people or 49% of Hong Kong 
population were living in public permanent housing. Amongst this proportion of 
households, about 37% of them were in subsidized sale flats (18.3% out of total 
population). For every year, about 1.5 billion of public expenditure is allocated on the 
public housing program. Such vast amount of resources dedicated and huge number of 
individuals involved entice my idea to model the public housing market with the private 
real estate market for our thorough study. 
3 The content of Tenant Purchase Scheme and Home Purchase Loan Scheme will be delegated into the 
appendix. 
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Table 1 - Distribution of population by type of housing 
Year (as at first quarter) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Public rental housing (%) 35 31 31 31 30 30 30 31 
Subsidized sale flats (%) 16 18 18 19 19 18 19 18 
Private permanent housing (%) 48 50 50 50 50 51 50 50 
Temporary housing (%) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Mid-year population ('000) 6665 6714 6744 6731 6784 6813 6857 6922 
(Source: Hong Kong Housing Authority) 
2.2. The Emerging Subsidized Housing Market 
In 1997, the Home Ownership Scheme (HOS) was launched to partially relax the transfer 
restrictions on HOS housing units. Under the scheme, households who occupied the HOS 
units more than three years are eligible to trade their houses in the HOS secondary market 
in which they need not pay back the subsidized portion of land premiums (normally 
35-50 per cent discount to market) back to the Housing Authority (HA). Furthermore, 
owners can also sell their HOS units in the open market after five years with the land 
premiums returned to HA. An active HOS secondary market was therefore emerging. The 
implication of the policy is that the HOS housing units become a close substitute to the 
private housing units and most likely provided the households with a formerly 
unavailable opportunity to buy their houses at a discounted price that they could easily 
afford. That significantly crowds out part of the potential private house buyers from the 
market. 
Although HA recently attempted to tighten the eligibility criteria for HOS applicants, the 
restrictions are merely affect those prospective owners while leaving the existing owner 
unaffected. Such substitute effect is substantially remained in the housing market. Even 
worse, the redevelopment program of some urban area into HOS estates further makes 
the location of these HOS estates much more attractive. Basically, the HOS secondary 
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market was provided with an alternative market for eligible households to trade their 
houses, which means a direct competition with the private housing market. Thereby, the 
HA had accepted the Government's recommendation on cessation of the production and 
sale of HOS flats indefinitely from 2003 onwards. The small number of unsold and 
returned HOS flats would not be offered for sale as subsidized housing units before the 
end of 2006. 
2.3. The Comparable Private Housing Market 
After taking a quick glance on the HOS market, one may query how the seemingly 
separated subsidized housing market interacts with the private housing market. In fact, 
we can make some inference from the transactions statistics of buyers in both HOS 
market and its comparable counterpart in private housing sector. In the figure below, it is 
a rough sketch of the market transactions in the three markets of public rental housing 
(transactions under tenants purchase scheme), subsidized housing (transactions under 
HOS) and private housing. The vertical axis is showing the housing price and the 
horizontal axis is the median income of households. You can see a portion of the 
transactions in subsidized and private housings are under a similar price range and they 
belong to the same household group with similar median income. That simply implies 
both markets are having the same potential group of buyers. (Overlapped area means the 
impossible interactions between the markets) Besides, the bubbles' size shown in the 
figure is the transaction volume of the corresponding market. We can see the transaction 
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Figure 2 — The conceptual sketch of the market interactions 
Further examine the market transactions in HOS secondary market, HOS open market 
and private market with the price below two million (which is the price range of the HOS 
housing units); we can see the transactions of HOS accounted for 4 to 10% of the 
abovementioned markets. It is only a conservative estimate as we don't have further 
categorized price ranges for the private housing units. Since most of the HOS flats lies on 
the price from 1 to 1.5 million, we can easily infer there will be a higher proportion of 
HOS relative to their corresponding counterparts. 
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Table 2 - The number of transactions in the HOS secondary market, HOS open 
market, and private market with price range below two million 
Year HOS HOS Private Secondary Private Secondary 
Secondary Market Open Market Market (< IM) Market (1-2M) 
1997 989 — — — 
1998 2447 - - -
1999 3494 - - -
2000 2412 - - -
2001 2927 3750 5481* 9815* 
2002 2152 3310 19974 27804 
2003 2320 4420 22838 27800 
2004 1820 5920 25782 31424 
2005 1624 6600 23768 32300 
2006 1932 5450 19606 26832 
N o t e : f i gu re wi th * ind ica tes the n u m b e r o f t r ansac t ion f r o m O c t o b e r to D e c e m b e r on ly . 
Source: The Land Registry, Rating & Valuation Department and Hong Kong Housing Authority 
Figures are derived from the tables of 
(1) "Domestic Primary and Secondary Sales - Number of Sale and Purchase Agreements and Total 
Consideration (up to January 2008)" at http://www.rvd.qov.hk/tc/doc/statistics/rvd7 3.pdf 
(2) Graphic Presentation on Housing Statistics 2007，section 3.5 "HOS Open Market" and 3.7"Secondary 
Market Scheme" http://www.housinqauthoritv.qov.hk/b5/aboutus/resources/statistics/0...00.html 
When the interactions of both markets are basically there, the next step would be making 
some assumptions of our model which justify with the reality. As you can read in the 
paper, we attempt to adopt the competitive search model with the assumptions of (1) 
price bargaining and endogenously determined market tightness, (2) with free entry of 
sellers' side as well as (3) the free flow of buyers in between the markets. Let us show the 
justifications one by one. 
As for the price determination, both types of housings are essentially priced according to 
the market supply and demand. Such pricing is governed by a bargaining process. 
Analogously, it is a negotiation between buyer and seller, and we will use the Nash 
bargaining solution to depict the property pricing in the later model setup. Once both 
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parties agree on a price, they will trade at that agreed price. Although the price of public 
housing units is determined by the government in advanced the sale, the price is 
somehow taking the private housing market price as a reference/ 
For the entry of sellers in the market of private housing, it is of free entry in ex-ante sense. 
Before the private developers decided to enter the market, they will make the decision 
based on their expectation. In the long run, the sellers are having an expected value 
(referred as the reservation value of selling a house). If the price of selling a house is 
higher than the reservation value, sellers will enter the market. Since we can see there are 
a large number of individual developers in a given market while one's actions have no 
significant impact on others. Besides, you can consider most of the housing units are 
perfect substitutes; that is, there is no product differentiation. Everyone, including buyer, 
knows the approximated prices prevailing in the market before they determine to 
purchase ones' house. Nearly perfect and complete information we can see for both 
parties in the housing market lead the residential housing market becomes a competitive 
market in ex-ante sense. Most importantly, any private developers in the long run may 
enter or exit the market. As Individual buyers and sellers act independently, the market is 
in a situation where there is impossible for groups of buyers and sellers to have the 
collusion and cartels. That justifies one of the model assumptions - all private sellers in 
the long run can freely enter the market according to what they plan. 
Another assumption which is indispensable but rather strong in our model would be the 
assumption of free flow buyers in between two comparable submarkets. What rationale 
can the author base on for validating the two submarkets interact with each other? It is 
due to the behavior of a buyer. Given a budget constraint, one would consider the value 
of a house according to its quality and price of resale. The former judgment is what we 
call a consumption decision while the later refers as the investment decision. These two 
4 The Report of the Housing Authority's Ad Hoc Committee on Sale of Flats to Sitting Tenants, for 
example, tabled five alternative pricing schemes as possible choices. They are calculated on the bases of, 
respectively, (i) the Home Ownership Scheme pricing formula, which sets prices for home ownership 
scheme flats at discounts of 30 to 45 percent of their assessed market values; (ii) placement cost inclusive 
of land opportunity cost; (iii) development cost only; (iv) capitalization of rent; and, finally, (v) historical 
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main decision rules basically govern most of the consumers' behavior in the housing 
market and hence imply for the assertion that potential buyers will move in between the 
subsidized housing and private housing market. Since we can see the housing quality of 
HOS flats is similar to or even higher than those private housings with comparable price 
range, it is undoubtedly an alternative option for many private housing buyers before they 
really decide entering a market. Moreover, at the same time, this group of potential 
buyers will also consider the private housing instead of HOS flats because of the reselling 
price and those restrictions of HOS, like the premium repaid to Housing Authority and 
the time control on HOS flats' resale. That's why these markets look like to be segregated 
but actually in ex-ante sense they are two comparable markets with interactions. 
2.4. A Tale of the 85,000 Policy 
Combined with all the abovementioned extensive initiatives in promoting home 
ownership, such entire measures formulate a well-known housing policy in Hong Kong 
entitled "85,000 housing policy". (It's denominated in this way as the main idea of the 
policy targets on constructing at least 85,000 flats a year). The policy was implemented 
under the Tung Chee Hwa government in early 1997 and basically the policy was 
denoted here. 
Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa has also announced his government's intention to 
reduce the waiting time for public rental housing from about seven years to three years, 
and persuading wealthier public tenants to vacate their rental units and buy homes with 
government assistance as a major part of the strategy to accomplish the goal of "85,000 
policy". 
The rationale behind the "85,000 policy" is related to the affordability of housing. In 
public policy discussion, the affordability of housing receives a great public concern 
cost. In practice the various formulae do provide an agenda for discussion, but they are irrelevant unless the 
prices corresponding to these formulae are within the price range that tenants are willing to consider. 
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because of two factors (Quigley and Raphael, 2004). Plausibly, housing is the single 
largest expenditure item in the budgets of most families and individuals. The average 
household devotes roughly one quarter of income to housing expenditures, while poor 
and near-poor households commonly devote half of their income to housing. Since the 
expenditure on housing is a large proportion of an individual's income, the small 
percentage changes in housing prices and rents will have a large impact on non-housing 
consumption and household well-being. 
Besides, Hong Kong has experienced recent and well-publicized increases in housing 
prices and rents. The increase of housing price in certain extent revealed more household 
will not be affordable to possess their living-quarters. The policy sounds an effective 
remedy to provide affordable housing; however, as the paper illustrated how the 85,000 
policy itself simply ignored its detrimental short run effect on both public and private 
housing market, but just focusing on the long run effect. As a result, the emergence of the 
HOS secondary market as well as the TPS and HPLS creates two separate markets in 
which one is highly subsidized while leaving the other unsubsidized. Such structural 
boredom due to 85,000 housing policy is still rippling in the property market nowadays. 
3. Literature Review on the Model Choice 
Identified the two submarkets we are going to study, next step we have to discuss the 
model that we adopted in this paper. Our modeling choice is intuitive. The price 
dispersion widely observed in the real estate market is difficult to be reconciled with the 
Walrasian framework, and naturally leads one to a search-theoretic setting (Leung and 
Zhang, 2006). Amongst the search-theoretic frameworks, we choose competitive search 
to model the interactions between private and public housings with reasons. In earlier 
search-theoretic frameworks modeling housing market, like Wheaton (1990), both the 
sellers and buyers are unable to differentiate themselves at the beginning of the search 
process. One of the consequences is the difficulty in addressing the time-on-the-market 
issues together with the price dispersion. However, in the modern real estate market, it is 
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usually segregated into several submarkets in which buyers and sellers are ex-ante 
targeting to enter. 
The specific features of real estate market are inadequate to be explained with the 
traditional search frameworks, and more importantly, there are perhaps no theoretical 
works to incorporate the subsidized housing for policy studies. Hence, the author in this 
paper tries to adopt the competitive search framework based on the seminal work in 
Moen (1997)，where the private housing sellers are free to enter the high type submarkets 
and the tightness of the submarkets is endogenized, to fill up the vacuum in the housing 
studies' literatures. 
This paper compares the long run and short run equilibrium of a real estate market model 
in which both equilibriums are different because of the assumed market structures. In the 
long run equilibrium, market transactions are taking place in a highly decentralized 
market with search friction where buyers and sellers match randomly and bargain 
bilaterally over the housing price. We assume there are two submarkets, namely public 
and private housing sectors with posted prices. Buyers can freely direct their search 
across these submarkets and within each submarket there is again search friction. 
Whereas in the short run equilibrium, we assumed buyers can no longer freely choose 
their entrance in either market. Following most search theorists, the market structure 
pinned down here is denoted as competitive search framework. 
The concept of competitive search equilibrium has been widely used in labor economics, 
and was recently introduced into monetary economics by Rocheteau and Wright (2005). 
Author in this paper attempts to further adopt such framework to model the interactions 
between the public and private housing markets because the framework can beautifully 
capture the characteristics of the markets. Competitive search equilibrium is based on the 
idea that some agents can post a price or, more generally, a contract that specifies the 
terms at which buyers and sellers commit to transactions. Buyers and sellers in the 
housing market can observe the posted prices and choose the market they enter. In 
competitive search model, frictions are manifested by the number of buyers showing up 
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at a seller's location; while in other versions of the competitive search framework, it 
depicted the agents get to choose a location with a given price but still have to search for 
trading partners at the marketplace (Moen 1997). In either case, there is partially directed 
search, and this generates competition among price setters. Back to the seminal work of 
Diamond (1982) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), they captured the labor market 
with search friction. Analogously, the search framework can be adopted to sculpt the 
housing market at which the search friction is significant. Thanks to the pioneering works 
by Wheaton (1990); the search framework is firstly borrowed from labor economics to 
study the housing market. His model yields a strongly theoretical inverse relationship 
between vacancies and prices, in which with competitive supply, the model explain the 
existence of long run structural vacancies. 
The eminent works by Wheaton (1990) in characterizing a strong decentralized pattern of 
exchange with severe search frictions is inadequate to address the issue of the 
time-on-the-market with the price dispersion, since both buyers and sellers in the model 
are unable to differentiate themselves at the beginning of the search process. Additionally, 
the modern housing market is usually separated into several submarkets targeting to some 
specific features of the buyers and sellers in order to improve the resource allocation. 
This specific market feature is not modeled in the earlier search theoretic framework, but 
in fact it is paramount in the actual real estate market. Moen (1997) in his seminal work 
on competitive search framework provided us with elements to study the housing markets. 
His work constructed the equilibrium for markets with frictions, whereas all agents are 
price takers who maximize their utility subject to a set of market parameters. All 
attributes in Moen's paper provided a strong theoretical foundation for my work to study 
the public housing markets. The desirable attributes would be discussed throughout the 
model build up. 
Besides, another contribution of the paper is its policy implications to the public housing 
market. With the aid of our model, the author tries to further elaborate how we can avoid 
the unintended consequences of policy making in public housing by incorporated the 
consideration of time horizon. To put the contention briefly, this paper attempts to show 
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why the 85,000 housing policy implemented by the HKSAR government in the year of 
1997 encountered remarkable failure. The reason is that the policy makers only take the 
long run influences as the basis in designing the policy, while totally ignore the short run 
effect in the market. That's one of the implications we want to be drawn from our model 
setup. 
In the following sections, the basic setup of the Competitive search framework will be 
introduced. Both long run and short run model are well explained and discussed in the 
sections afterward. 
4. The Model 
4.1. The Basic Setting 
Consider a housing market with two submarkets indexed by i = H,L; namely the 
high-end (H) and low-end market (L) respectively. In each submarket, there are 
the corresponding buyers aiming at their own type of houses in which we can call them 
high type (召“）and low type buyers . Similarly, we define S" and S^, 
as the measure of sellers on the two submarkets respectively. The model employed here 
in this paper is the competitive search framework and it is chosen with reasons. Consider 
the modern housing market; both sellers and buyers are able to differentiate themselves at 
the beginning of the search process. Usually the housing market in nowadays is separated 
into several submarkets in which particular features of buyers and sellers involved. Prior 
to the search process, buyers can decide which market they would like to enter. This 
setup is consistent with what we observe in the reality. In our model, the high type sellers 
resemble the private developers, while the low type sellers are the units of flats sold 
under the public housing scheme. 
In order to keep everything as simplest as possible, the analysis would be a static model 
in which we can see how the two separated markets interact with each other. For each 
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submarket i, the number of successful matching in an infinitesimal period is governed by 
a random matching f u n c t i o n , , 5 ' ) , which exhibits constant return to scale in both B 
and S with positive but diminishing marginal returns in each argument. (z.e.M, {B, > 0 
and M^ {B, 5) > 0; <0and M^^ {B, S) < 0). We define the market tightness 
as B' I in which we can infer that it is more difficult for a buyer to find a seller in a 
market with higher market tightness. In each submarket i , rf，by definition, is the 
flow of matching rate for a buyer to find a seller in submarket i such that, 
B U 
Likewise, the flow matching rate for a seller to find a buyer, A''，satisfies: 
= = (Eqn.2 ) 
Next, we need to consider the Bellman equations which characterized our search model. 
The actual price for every submarket i would be determined by a Nash bargaining 
solution, which will be discussed in the next subsection. When every seller chooses to 
enter either of the submarkets, there will be an entry value associated with the seller 
which is denoted as IT . Correspondingly, let 厂 be the value for type i buyers, 
while is the value of a house owners in each market, which is independent of the 
waiting cost. 
Search cost is also considered in our model which is denoted as c ' . We incorporated the 
search cost as we understand in housing market, market friction is crucial in the 
transaction process. Whoever wants to buy a house, one should go through the process of 
searching. That's why we include this variable into our Bellmen we introduced below. 
The housing price in our model is indicated as P' which is one of variables drawn our 
16 
much attention. Since real estate price are empirically shown its coupling with the 
macroeconomic outlook, our model will offer a deeper understanding how the housing 
price altered in a more micro perspective. 
Now, we are accoutered with the Bellman equations for both buyers and sellers 
respectively, 
r'V' =-c' +77'(Q' -P'-V') (Eqn.3) 
/ • ' n ' = / / ( P ' - n ' ) (Eqn.4) 
From equation (3)，we can obtain 
厂,=-c'+ 7 7 ' ( n ' - P ' ) = - c ' V + C Q ' - P ' ) 
一 — + v _ 1 以 
‘ (Eqn. 5) 
The equation (5) is the buyers' value which can be interpreted as the discounted net gain 
from purchasing a house. Noted that I / / ; ' is, in fact, the mean waiting time for the 
buyers and hence it implies the waiting cost is also discounted from the buyers' value 
during the searching period. 
Similarly, equation (4) can be rearranged and yields, 
n'- = = 户 
…'丨… (Eqn. 6) 
where l / / i ' can be inferred as the expected time-on-the-market for sellers. Hence, 
equation (6) shows that the entry value of the house sellers is simply the discounted 
housing price associated with the waiting period. 
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As we want to express the buyers' value in terms of the exogenous variables, we next 
consider eliminating the P' from the equation V'. By firstly considering the value 
function 厂"explicitly, we have: 
” = - � " " + ( Q : — ( E q „ . 7 ) 
1 + r / 77 
At the equilibrium, the buyers's values in the two submarkets are the same, i.e. 
V" = V^., since buyers are free to choose either submarket inside the model. 
4.2. Basic Assumptions of the Model Setup 
To begin with the discussion, here we have several assumptions for the whole model 
setup. 
“ B u y e r s can freely move in between the submarkets, hence the buyers' reservation 
value in both markets are the same. 
• All Q',c', and r are exogenously determined 
• Time preference f for both markets are the same^ 
4.3. Deal or no deal on a house? 
In reality, we can easily find that transactions in real estate market are undergoing a 
bargaining process. We therefore employ the Nash bargaining as the price determination 
process in our model setup which fundamentally conforms to the reality. The housing 
price under a competitive market is determined by the Nash bargaining procedure and 
therefore it requires us to solve the following joint surplus maximization problem: 
5 Since the time preference is quite complicated to be analyzed and doesn't carry much implication in 
policy making, we will skip its discussion throughout the model. 
18 
m a x = [p' - n ' . Y ( q ' - P' - V'广’ （Eqn. 8) 
where is the bargaining power of sellers in market i and 1 — is the 
bargaining power of buyers. The solution is therefore: 
= (Eqn. 9) 
Based on the equation (5)，(6), and (7), we rearrange equation (6) as (10) and substitute it 
into (9) 
= r i + 4 V ' 
乂 "乂 (Eqn. 10) 
We can also derive the following relationship from the bargaining solution (see appendix 
for the derivation) 
T?' + p丨口丨 + r' - P'rf = /3'(rQ' + cQ = — + 1-/3' + . 
？ 了 (Eqn. 11) 
Observe that the right hand side is decreasing in 0', we can infer that the increase in 
9' will lead an increase in IT'. Hence, we can show how the entry value of sellers 
is related to the market tightness 11' and 0'. 
5. Model in Long Run 
5.1. Assumptions of Model in the Long Run 
Prior to the detail discussion of our long run model setup, we firstly state out the 
assumptions in the long run model. 
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• Owing to the nature of competitive market, there is free entry for the sellers. 
• Sellers' reservation value in private market n " is fixed, while the reservation value 
of public housing sellers n ^ can be varied 
The assumptions are basically justified by the fact that in the real estate market, any 
people with comparable income can freely choose in between the private and public 
housings in ex-ante sense. Therefore the reservation value to become a buyer would be 
the same in both markets. As the sellers in high end market, namely the private 
developers in our model, can freely enter their market. 
The free entry for private housing developers implies its reservation value to be fixed at a 
constant level. The reason for such fixed entry value is that we assume all the sellers have 
the option to move outside the housing sector and obtain the same fixed value from other 
businesses; whereas government has no such outside option. The public subsidized 
housing is usually a predetermined policy in society and hence the no fixed entry value is 
imposed for the subsidized housing sellers - which is our government in this case. 
Besides the value of a housing owner, the search cost of buyers and the discounted factor 
are exogenous because they are determined by the quality of housing units, waiting 
mechanism and individual's preferences respectively. We will treat them all to be 
exogenously determined in our model setup. 
2 0 
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Figure 3 - Graphical illustration of the long run model 
5.2. Value Function of Buyers 
In long run, since the entry value of sellers in high end market (i.e. n " the reservation 
value of sellers) is assumed to be fixed, the price of houses in the private sector can be 
expressed in terms of ^ ^ = (1 + and hence we have: 
厂 " - c H / i f + - (1 + 
1 + r / rjH 
一 — ’ 办 … z H ! ^ ) 
— 1 + " < 1 ， * ) 一 ） 
By inferring the equation above, we can conclude that V " is decreasing in Q" \ 
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increasing in Q."; decreasing in c" , and r, therefore 
K " = V " ( V ^ Q " ， C " ， H " " | (Eqn. 13) 
V - + — - / 
What does the value function of buyers in private market tell us? From the equation (13)， 
we can infer that the buyers' value is inversely related to its market tightness ) . The 
reason accounted for this relation is that: when the market becomes much tightened in 
which too many buyers chase too few sellers, the buyers' value will be lower as buyers 
cannot find sufficient houses supplied in the market. Besides, if your value of owing a 
house (q^ ) increases in the market, it easily implies that the buyers' value in the market 
would increase as well. 
For the search cost, the relationship is straightforward. The higher the search cost is, 
fewer buyers' value is resulted. 
As for the owners' value, or interpreted as the quality of housing, it is positively related to 
the buyers' value. Since the high quality housing units means the higher value to be 
owners. If you are a buyer who is going to purchase a high quality house, the value of 
owing better quality housing does mean a higher value to be a buyer. 
It's worth noticing that the buyers' value is independent of the bargaining power in the 
high end market because the value of buyers in private market is fundamentally attributed 
by the supply of the market which is fixed in the long run situation. While the implicit 
functional form of low-end market buyers^ {V^), we are also required to substitute the 
— H 
value pL in order to see its relationship with the exogenous variables. Unlike n , 
the entry value of the public sector, the sellers' entry value in public housing market 
6 See appendix for the derivation of F*" which is the inverse function for V*" i.e. F*"=1aA 
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(n^ ) is not a fixed constant. Under the competitive search framework, we know 
V" = V^, and we substitute the price functions in the corresponding market. 
yL 二 (•..)] 
r/L+r 
- [，+>•](— I 
I 古)+/l'-A/(OM�+r] J 
(Eqn. 14) 
乂 -十 - -乂 (Eqn. 15) 
To let you keep track with the meaning of every function, here we provided more 
intuitions of the buyers' value function in the public housing market. Similar to the 
private market, the market tightness of the public housing is negatively related to the 
buyers' value function. The logic is explicit. The more buyers in the markets would 
trigger a keener competition and therefore the buyers' value decreases. 
When owners' value in the public market increases, the value obtained by buyers will 
naturally increase as well. 
As for the search cost, the interpretation is again straightforward. The higher search cost a 
buyer required, the lower value of buyers attained in buying a house. 
Different from the private housing market, sellers' bargaining power in the public housing 
has its influence towards the buyers' value. Since the price of public housing depends on 
the bargaining process in which will affect the buyers' value. 
After considering the buyers' value function, now we turn to the next important function 
of our model setup; that is "the determination of price" in our model, 
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5.3. What do the Pricing Functions p" and p^ depend on? 
Since P " is simply obtained from equation P ^ = (1 + where n " 
is being the constant. 
f i \ 
P' = ( 1 + ]n' 
乂 " 乂 （Eqn. 10) 
However, is a bit complicated because n ^ is no longer fixed in our model. 
Consider equation (10)，if we make H^ as the subject, and substitute P^ as the 
shown in equation (6)，we can explicitly calculate the entry value according to the 
equation (9) 
一 咖 卜 ( E q n . 16) 
Thus, we can find out how the P^ can be expressed in terms of and 
pL. 
, 二 广 1 + , A + c乙） 
V + + (Eqn. 17) 
The actual price in either submarket can further relate it to the market tightness 0' 
according to the matching function ，•）. 
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r [ ( l 一 沪)M(l’士）+ \) + r' 
L \ " � （Eqn. 18) 
Partially consider inside the square bracket of the denominator, i.e. 
(1 一 + pL_L’ + ^  
\ QL J 
= 乙 ’ + 乙M沪’ 1 ) � 1 
d L 6 -
By dividing both numerator and denominator of P^, we can see P^ is increasing 
in pL. Simply total differentiate the equation (11) w.r.t 0' , we can figure out a neat 
relationship between P' and 9' 
^ > 0 
dd' 
The rationale of such relationship is simple. When the market is being tighter in which 
too many buyers chase too few houses, the actual prices are bid up in both markets. The 
finding is reasonable as it is more difficult to match the buyers and sellers in a market 
with a higher tightness. We can simply put the price as a function of 0' given the 
value of and c' are available. The effect of time preference 
is omitted 
here in the equations because the variable of r' depends on the market tightness 0'. 
(see the detail explanation in the appendix) However, the time preference doesn't have 
much significant meaning to the model and therefore for simplicity, we will drop it out 
during the discussion of the comparative static results. 
In functional form, for the sign of function P， we have: 
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乂 + + + _ 乂 (Eqn. 19) 
For the function it will be: 
V + + + + 乂 (Eqn. 20) 
5.4. Sellers' Value Function in Public Market 
We almost get everything we needed, except the entry value n^ of the government. 
一H 
Unlike H ，it is varying with the endogenous variables in our model. Once we know 
the entry value of government on the market, we would know how the public housing 
supply influences the whole real estate market. Again, by equation (16), we have 
n , — 昨(KlL + cL) 
- k T W T T T ^ (一 21) 
Substitute the equation (8) into (16); we can get the entry value of public developers as: 
L y + _、 '） + "」 （Eq„.22) 
Implicitly, we can interpret n^ ^as the function of 
1 R e m a r k : p l e a s e r ead t h e de r i va t i on o f the c o m p a r a t i v e s ta t ic resu l t s in t h e a p p e n d i x , 
2 6 
/ \ 
n ^ = g (Eqn. 23) 
V + + + + J 
The sellers' reservation value of selling a house in the public housing market depends, 
first of all, positively on the owners' value. The higher value of house owners leads a 
higher sellers' value to keep their housing units in the market. Second, the high search 
cost reduces the number of buyers in the market and thus sellers will keep their housing 
stock for selling at a higher price. Third, the bargaining power of sellers is also 
positively related to the sellers' value because a higher bargaining power usually gives a 
more desirable selling price for sellers and therefore a higher sellers' value. At last, the 
sellers' value in public housing market depends positively onto the market tightness. A 
tighter market is in fact more beneficial to the sellers since you may treat a tighter market 
as a pool in which too many buyers search a number of limited houses. Sellers can thus 
ask for a higher price and naturally the sellers' value will be enhanced. 
5.5. The Key of our Model - Market Tightness of both Markets 
Upon previous section, we have discussed the buyers' value functions and price functions 
for both markets. Also we have explained the sellers' value function. What remained to 
be discussed is a key to our model - the market tightness e " and e ' . L e t us leave the 
derivation of the functions for both market tightness in the appendix first and asserts the 
implicit functions as follows: 
( —h\ 
e" =e" (Eqn. 24) 
V - - - + J 
(Eqn. 25) 
V + - + + - - J 
The market tightness is defined as the buyers to seller's ratio in a market which 
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plays an important role in our model set up. Every exogenous variable will alter the 
market tightness and in return affects the endogenous variables. The policy implication of 
this relationship will be discussed in the later part of this paper. At this moment, let us 
further consider how the market tightness reconciles with the characteristics of housing 
market in the real world. 
For the market tightness in the public sector …， i t is defined as 菩• If there is an 
o 
increase in owners' value in the public housing market, more people will choose to buy 
the public housing units, thus tightening its market tightness. It's obvious that everybody 
wants to have a better living condition. If there is an increase in owners' value in private 
housing, buyers will go for that market, and hence the buyers to seller's ratio will be 
lessened. Similarly, the increase of search cost in public housing market leads to a 
decrease in market tightness because fewer people want to have the costly search and turn 
• i j 
to the alternative market instead. That would be an opposite case for an increase in c . 
The bargaining power of sellers affects the market tightness in a similar logic. 
For the market tightness in private market O", despite similar to that of public 
housing sector, but it is not explained exactly the same as . 
It is not difficult to see the increase in search cost will hinder some buyers to search their 
houses in the private market which results a decrease in market tightness 9" . Besides, 
if the bargaining power of the sellers in private market becomes higher, fewer buyers will 
enter the market because of the higher price, hence the relative lower market tightness is 
observed. For the sellers' entry value, which is the reservation value of sellers in private 
market is positively related to the market tightness. Since an increase in reservation value 
for sellers means fewer people are willing to sell their flats in the market and therefore 
lower the numbers of sellers in the market. The decrease in number of sellers therefore 
tightens the market. Noteworthy that the market tightness in the private housing market is 
merely attributed by the exogenous variables in its own market, thus it is independent of 
Q.'' , and r. The reason accounted for this property is due to the competitive market 
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nature in the private housing sector. 
5.6. Population Flow of the Model 
If you are cautious, you may immediately understand there are 3 unknowns in this 
system of equations, including and B^. In fact, that's not enough for us to 
solve the system. Further equations are required; hence the population flow is called for. 
Consider the model in the long run, the aggregate number of buyers and sellers would be 
affected by some exogenously determined factors, for example, the demographic change 
of a city can vivaciously affect the housing demand which in turn alters the number of 
buyers in the market. The demographic change can be the population growth of the cities 
or any migration policy. While the corresponding type of sellers in the market would on 
the way to adjust their supply which is considered as the change of numbers of sellers in 
the market. To depict such situation in the long run, we have the following dynamic flow 
of the buyers and sellers. 
On the one hand, since buyers are freely entering the market; an exogenously determined 
inflow of buyers comes into the market at the rate of value b; whereas at the same time a 
proportion of buyers who has brought their premises in either types of market leave the 
real estate market at the buying rate (77'). Presenting it as a part of model, we have: 
+ =b-T]"B" -tjLbl (Eqn. 26) 
On the other hand, the sellers of the corresponding market types {S') will enter the 
market at the rate of a'，and similarly a proportion of sellers who sell their houses at 
the selling rate {/u') . Mathematically, it would be: 
S" =a"-JLl"S" (Eqn. 27) 
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SL = aL - j u L S L (Eqn.28) 
At the steady state, the flow of change of buyers and sellers would be static, and therefore 
B " + BL = 0;iS" = 0 ; S^ =0. Thus, we further obtain the equations in form of: 
b-T]"B" -rj^B^ = 0 (Eqn.29) 
a" - Li"S" = 0 
^ (Eqn. 30) 
^ (Eqn. 31) 
5.7. Procedure of Solving the Model 
Recalling the definition of 0'，thus the buyers to seller's ratio (B'/S') in the 
particular market, we can solve the equations in the procedure outline below. 
With the equations (23), (24) and (25), we can solve (9"，(9\ and n ^ respectively. 
Provided the values of Q" and , we can infer the buying rate (77' ) and selling rate 
(/i ') in the corresponding market, as both buying rate Of) as well as selling rate (" ' ) 
are the function of 0'. 
The procedure of manipulating the equations is iterative and if you carefully follow the 
steps below, you can plausibly understand how we can solve the system of equations. To 
begin with, we need a strong but realistic assumption - the inflow of public housing 
/ / —L 
rate a is fixed, {a = a ) . I t captures the reality in the sense that every 
government will well plan their public housing under their housing projects. Hence, we 
can solve 人 by the equation (31) in which, 
3 0 
—L 
SL (Eqn. 32) 
Therefore we can immediately determine SL, 
SL = 办 ] 
L - + J (Eqn. 33) 
The equation tells us if the selling rate increases, the sellers in public housing market 
would be lowered; whereas, the higher inflow rate of public housing units naturally 
implies more public houses are there in the market. 
ql = 
Followed by the sellers in the public housing market, we can use s'- to find out 
S^ = ^ 
the value of B , by substituting ’ which gives: 
BL = SLdL = = = 、 
乂 “ (Eqn. 34) 
BL = B^ 
L + + J (Eqn. 35) 
Similar to the number of sellers in the public housing market, the number of buyers in the 
market is attributed by its market tightness and the inflow rate of sellers. Once we know 
BL and 
with equation (34), we can implicitly solve 
BH 
provided that b is 
exogenously given: 
BH = b-ifBL = h_aL 
^ ” (Eqn. 36) 
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L+ - (Eqn. 37) 
The number of buyers in the private housing market also depends on the population 
growth of buyers in the model and inflow rate of sellers in public housing market. As 
more public housing units comes into its corresponding market, buyers who are seeking 
for the private housing may change their targeted market and find their home in public 
estates. Therefore fewer buyers exist in private housing market. 
Besides, one point worth our attention is that the population growth will firstly affect the 
private sectors' buyers but not the public housing market. The reason is not difficult to 
understand. Since all people in the long run want to buy their houses in the private market 
first or otherwise without suitable houses, they will turn to another market for searching 
the alternatives. 
Now, we have B" and we come to find the number of sellers in the private market, 
cH ^ 
S" by - 0" . Again the S" can be expressed in terms as follows: 
？" = f = b-a^ 
nH ,,H 
^ (Eqn. 38) 
which implies, 
^ - + - J (Eqn. 39) 
We can expect that the inflow rate of sellers in public housing market increases, fewer 
sellers enter the private housing market; while the population growth leads to an increase 
of seller in private housing market. 
Finally, we come to the last step of closing the recursive solution by finding out the value 
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of a " where it is equal to 
^H ,,H c<H 
a = // 6 
- L (Eqn. 40) 
=b-a 
which is a constant depends on the population growth as well as inflow rate of sellers. 
a" = 
_ J (Eqn. 41) 
The equation is in fact telling us the selling rate should be equal to the buying rate in the 
market. Since we know 
a" =m"S" (Eqn. 42) 
aL = JU^S^ = r i " B " (Eqn. 43) 
Adding both equations together, we get 
a" + aL = ifBH + jfBt = b ,,, 
‘ • (Eqn. 44) 
What we are interested in this model is the contention of how the public housing affects 
the real estate market and therefore comparative static is called for analyzing the policy 
implication. As O ^ , Q " , c " , j S " , a ' ' and b are exogenously given, we 
have formulated all the elements for us to conduct our comparative static in the long run. 
To save the space in the main content, the next section will only show the results of our 
o 
calculation. 
8 For the detail, please refer to the enclosed appendix section 10.7 
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5.8. Results of Comparative Static in Long Run 
In the long run, where n is given, the interactions amongst the variables are shown 
in the table below: 
Table 3 - The comparative static results of the model in long run 
e" I eL I nL I pH I pL I v^ ^ I vL I B" I I ^^^ 
a^ / / 1 1 / / / I + = + ~ 
~~b / 1 / / 1 / 1 + / + / ~ 
n " - - - + ~ + + I I + / 
1 + + / + / / / + / - T 
n ' ' + + + ？ + - - + + - - / 
- ？ ？ + ？ ？ ？ I ？ + ？ T~ 
/ - ？ / ？ / 1 / = 1 + T~ 
p" - - - + + + I I ~ + / 
/ + ？ / ？ / / 1 - / + T~ 
Note: 1. ••+•• denotes the positive relationship for two variables, while " - " denotes the negative one."?" 
means the effect is ambiguous and "/" is indicated both variables involved no change. 
2. The variables on the first row are the endogenous variables whereas the leftmost column on 
the shows the exogenously determined variables. 
5.9. Discussion of Long Run Model 
What differences distinguish the long run from short run model is that the number of 
buyers in the long run is no longer fixed and the model is characterized by the dynamic 
population flow of the society. Besides, the entry value of sellers in the long run is fixed. 
n ” We can see the private developers can freely supply the housing units in a 
particular desired level of quantities and that's the free entry assumption for the private 
housing market. This is in line with the reality where private developers can choose to 
provide the housing units under their considerable planning. With such model setup, in 
this section, we will explore the relationship of the market parameters in the Table 3) 
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shown. 
5.9.1. Change of Public Housing Supply 
One of the most important parameters in the model is the public housing inflow denoted 
as aL in the model. The logical flow goes in this way. When the public housing 
inflow increases, it pushes down the market tightness and boosts up the buyers' value in 
the public housing sector. Thus more buyers go for public housings and leave from the 
private housing market instead. Such outflow movement of buyers from private market 
leads to an increase in the public housing's market tightness until it offsets the decrease 
due to the higher supply in public housings. Therefore, the market tightness, price of 
properties and buyers' value in the public housing sector remain unchanged. 
For the private market, the change would be similar to that of public housings. Fewer 
buyers remained in the private market and hence lower the market tightness; however, 
free entry feature in private housing market triggers more sellers leave the market until 
the market tightness restore to the original level. As a result, the properties' price, buyers' 
values and market tightness remained unchanged as well. 
As we can see the results of comparative static, the increase in public housing would 
merely increase the number of buyers in the public market. Fewer private housing units 
would there are in the market, since part of them are substituted by the public housing. 
Everything goes as usual as long as the number of buyers is freely adjusted during the 
period. 
Proposition 1 In the long run competitive search framework in which buyers can 
freely flow in between the markets and sellers in private market are featured as 
competitive entry, the change of public housing inflow will only pull up the number of 
buyers and sellers in the public housing sector while push down of that in private 
housing sector，leaving all market attributes unaffected. 
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The 85,000 policy under the Tung Chee Hwa government in early 1997 pledged to 
provide 85,000 housing flats each year originally so as to resolve the problems of soaring 
property prices. The Utopian scene described here would be the long run phenomenon. 
Yet, such policy receives a total failure in which the plan was merely designed based on 
the long run situation. The purpose of "85,000 policy" is to stabilize the property price; 
however, the policy become almost immediately redundant because it accounts for the 
short run collapse in property markets which in return became a far more pressing 
problem in the years between 1998 and 2002. 
The reason why the 85,000 policy fails is that the government did not consider its short 
run impact on the property market. As we mentioned previously, the decent in housing 
price is unbearable from 1998 to 2002 in which every person in Hong Kong would never 
forget the tragedy. Despite theoretically, the supply of public housing does not exert any 
change in the housing market and basically it only enlarges the number of buyers in 
choosing the public housing; indeed, it is the Utopia. The ideal outcome costs a prolonged 
suffering period during the short run process. Thus, the model attributed why the property 
market price in respond to Tung Chee Hwa home-building initiative is a fiasco. 
5.9.2. Change of Population Inflow 
Regarding to the population flow, the parameter b also received our interest to study. The 
rate of population inflow can in fact be regarded as the immigration of a society. When 
the immigration arrives, it will firstly pull up both numbers of buyers in both housing 
markets; however, all population inflow would be finally inclined to enter the private 
market (without any change The mechanism goes in this way. 
When buyers enter the high end markets, it enhances the number of transactions and 
fewer sellers are therefore in the private housing market. Thus, the market is being 
tightened. A proportion of buyers in the private housing market leaves the private buyers 
and goes for the public housing market to seek their homes. Owing to the free entry 
property of the private housing market in long run，sellers come into the market until the 
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market tightness is adjusted back to the original level. At last, the buyers' value and 
market price would also remain unaffected due to free entry properties in the private 
housing market; whereas the number of buyers and sellers increases owing to the rise of 
population inflow. 
For the public market, it goes with a similar logic. After buyers entered the market, 
market tightness increases. The buyers' value goes down and more buyers leave the 
public housing market until the market tightness restores at the original level. As a result, 
nothing would affect the public housing market. 
Hence, we can see the population inflow (b) doesn't alter the values of 
V ' , 9 ' a n d n ^ in the long run. It matches the reality in the sense that in 
the long run people who are living in the public houses will entirely moves into the 
private housing market. The new comers in the public housing market will replace those 
who are living now in the public estates, as time goes by, the public housing would 
maintain at a certain level in the society. 
Proposition 2 (Immigration shock) In the long-run model, any change in buyers' 
population inflow will be finally absorbed by the private housing merely. 
5.9.3. Change of Owners' Value 
When we interpret the owners' values in our model, we might resemble the value as the 
housing quality. How it would affect the market depends on how the change of housing 
quality affects the buyers' value as well as the market tightness. The higher quality of 
housing in private market, for instance, raises the value of buyers in the private housing 
sector which would attract more buyers to come into the high end market and conversely 
drift away some of the buyers from public housing units. At the same time, a rise in 
private housing quality would also cause an increase of sellers' value exceeding the 
reservation value. Thus, more people are willing to sell their houses. Hence, we have a 
less tightened market in which more buyers would purchase their homes. However, 
number of buyers finally goes down as more sellers in the private housing market speed 
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up the transactions and finally fewer buyers remained in the market. Market price is 
therefore bid up. On the other hand, in the public housing sector, the number of buyers is 
conclusively lower and for that reason the lower matching rate causes more sellers 
remained in the market. Thus, we can say the market becomes less tightened and a lower 
price is observed as a result. 
For an increase of housing quality in the low end market, the value of buyers would be 
higher which attracts more buyers from the private housing market to the public housing 
market. Nevertheless, more buyers in the public housing market will drive up the 
matching rate which in response makes fewer sellers remained. That means the market 
becomes much tightened and hence it would conversely drift away some of the buyers 
from the low-end to the high-end market. Two effects are opposite, and direct effect 
dominates so that a tighter market results. Higher price is thus followed. For the number 
of buyers and sellers, buyer's value and price of high end market do not have any chance. 
Furthermore, in the private housing market, we can see all parameters, namely 
B",P" , and V"，are not affected since the change of buyers in the high end 
market will ultimately be accommodated by the free entry sellers. 
Proposition 3 In the long run, any change of owners' value in public housing sector 
will not affect the private housing sector; whereas the change in owners' value of 
private housing sector contribute a favorable effect to the buyers' value in both 
markets but an unfavorable effect to sellers，value in the public sector. 
5.9.4. Change of Sellers' Value in Private Market 
Sellers' value of private housing market is in fact the reservation value of the sellers. The 
reservation value of housing developers in the private market is the lowest price level at 
which the developers would be willing to sell the housing units. A housing unit which is 
priced at a level lower than the reservation value, it would be rejected by the sellers. 
The reservation price of a private housing developer is not set in stone and therefore can 
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change over time depends on a number of factors which include the increase/decrease of 
the seller's overall wealth, change in construction cost, maintenance cost, rate of return, 
and length of holding the house vacancies. A developer might also set a higher 
reservation value when considering a unit of a more desirable house unit as a 
compensating differential for selling their housing stocks. 
Many maintenance campaigns and regulations implemented by the government 
concerning the buildings' facilitates will be obviously a proxy for the sellers' value 
changes. When there is an increase of reservation value for private housing sellers, fewer 
sellers are willing to supply their houses on the market, and hence numbers of sellers in 
the private market shrank. The market is tightened and more buyers come into the market 
which drives down the value of buyers in the private market. The free flow condition of 
buyers leads the buyers switched from the high end market to the low end market for 
seeking their houses and hence the market tightness is pushed up in the public housing 
market. 
In the high end market, fewer buyers reduce the matching rate and thus more sellers 
stayed in the market. Besides, the decrease in sellers; however, reduces the market 
matching rate and more buyers are therefore in the market. By considering both offsetting 
effect, we can find effect due to sellers' decrease dominates and we conclude that the 
private housing market becomes more tightened. Besides, the higher reservation value 
also raises the price in the private housing market directly and we hence conclude that the 
change of high end housing price is ambiguous. 
In the low end market, more buyers in the market higher market tightness in the market 
and thus bids up the market price in the public housing market. Fewer sellers exist in the 
market and lower value of being a buyer in the public market due to the condition of 
tighter market. 
Proposition 4 (Change of value in outside options) Under the long run competitive 
search framework where only private sellers possess the reservation valuCy an increase 
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(a decrease) in sellers' reservation value tightened (relaxed) both public and private 
housing markets. 
5.9.5. Change of Search Cost 
As for the search cost of buyers in the private housing sector c " ，it is straightforward 
to be interpreted. The higher search cost in the private housing market leads to a drop in 
buyers' value. Fewer buyers want to search in the private housing market, and preferably 
switch into the public market to find their houses. That's why you observe the number of 
buyers in the private sector will finally fall; whereas in the public housing sector, the 
change in the number of buyers turns out to be ambiguous. The result can be explained in 
such a way. Despite some buyers come from the private market, there is an opposite 
effect. Since the increase of search cost in private market bid up the sellers' value at 
which is higher than the reservation value of original high end sellers, some sellers enter 
the market. That suppresses the market tightness in private market which drives up the 
buyers' value. Some low end market buyers leave the market and therefore you can see 
the change of buyers' number in public housing becomes ambiguous. 
The price of houses in private market would thus increase because of the decrease in 
market tightness. Since we mentioned at the very beginning of this paragraph, two 
opposite effects due to direct search cost increase and indirect effect of market tightness 
fall due to sellers' number increase coexist in private market. Similar logic is thereby for 
the public housing buyers. More people who come from the private housing sector seek 
for the public housing due to a rise of search cost in the high end market, but at the same 
time some buyers move out from the public housing due to the lower market tightness in 
the private market. Consequently, an increase in search cost at high end market causes the 
ambiguous effects on all public housing market parameter, including the market tightness, 
number of sellers, their values and the housing price in the low end market. In this case, 
we can analyze the result in two circumstances. Firstly, if the direct effect due to search 
cost dominates, the number of buyers would enlarge and therefore push up the market 
tightness. The higher selling rate in the market makes fewer sellers remained in the 
marketplace. As a result, the buyers' value would decrease while the market price would 
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boost up. Similarly, the second case is the mirror image of first one. If the indirect effect 
dominates, number of buyer decreases and therefore the less tightened market in which 
lower market price and higher buyers' value and more sellers found. 
For an increase of search cost in low end market c ^， i t goes into the similar 
interpretation as a search cost increase in high end market. First of all, a rise of search 
cost of public housing buyers lower the value of buyers in its market and thus 
yL < V" .More Buyers prefer to go for the private housing market to seek their homes. 
However, since fewer buyers in the public market relaxes its market tightness and thus 
attract some buyers back to the public housing sector. These two effects run in an 
opposite manner, yet the direct cost effect dominates. It turns out fewer buyers are 
therefore and more sellers are thereby remained in the public housing market. With a less 
tightened market due to fewer buyers as well as more sellers in the public housing market, 
price drops unquestionably. As for the private housing market, the number of buyers and 
sellers as well as its value and price do not have any effect on the change of low end 
market search cost. It is due to the free entry of sellers in the high end market. A decrease 
in number of buyers due to a higher search cost as well as an increase in number of 
buyers due to a less tightened market do not further affect the sellers' amount. The free 
entry character in the private market will automatically adjust for the change of buyers. 
Proposition 5 In a competitive search framework with heterogeneous waiting costs 
(c" , housing prices would be only different in the market with free entry feature 
despite the buyers and sellers with the same traits. Precisely speaking，the buyer in the 
private market with higher waiting costs would pay a higher housing price, in an effort 
to reduce the waiting costs by making the purchase faster. 
5.9.6. Change of Bargaining Power of Sellers 
At last, it comes to the discussion on the bargaining power of sellers in both markets. An 
increase of bargaining power of sellers in the high end market would firstly raise the 
sellers' value in the market. The exceeding sellers' value over the current reservation 
value for sellers would attract more sellers entering the market. Therefore the market 
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tightness relaxed. The increase of buyers' value due to the less tightened market would 
attract more buyers from the public housing market to purchase their houses in the high 
end market. In contrast, the effect of increasing sellers' amount would press down the 
number of buyers in the market since more transactions involved in the market. Finally, 
the effect from sellers' number rise dominates and hence fewer buyers left in the high end 
market. Private housing market therefore becomes less tightened and it further causes a 
higher market price in private housing market as a result. 
On the other hand, as part of buyers in public housing market is being attracted by the 
desirable housing price of private housing market, number of buyers in the market turns 
out to be lower. It further reduces the selling rate in the public housing market and as a 
consequence, more sellers stayed in the market. The market tightness in public housing 
market is being loosened. Accordingly, the number of sellers in the public housing 
market would increase and lower housing price would be resulted. 
Basically, the change of bargaining power of sellers in the public housing market can be 
analyzed in a similar manner as that in the private housing market. What makes the 
difference of sellers' bargaining power in the public housing market from the private 
housing market is that the beta in the public sector would also directly affect the buyers' 
value, while it is not the case for the private market. The more powerful of sellers in the 
public housing market will in the first round weaken the buyers' intention of entering the 
markets, thus the some buyers step out from the market. The fall in number of buyers in 
the public housing diminishes the matching rate and hence more sellers stayed in the 
public sector. Public housing market happens to be less tightened and part of buyers will 
be attracted back to the market due to the much relaxed market. Finally the effect of 
decrease in sellers' amount dominated and less tightened market results. Market price of 
public housing market appeared to be less valuable due to the higher bargaining power of 
government. Number of buyers in the private housing market turns out to be unaffected 
as both opposite change of buyers because of the tightened market as well as the lower 
beta are adjusted by the free entry of the buyers in the private housing market. 
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6. Model in Short Run 
6.1. Assumptions of Model in the Short Run 
To start our short run model, let us discuss some of the basic assumptions for the short 
run model. 
“ N o free entry for the private housing market sellers 
• Sellers' reservation values in both private and public market are endogenized 
• No exogenous inflow of buyers and sellers outside the model 
Here we can develop the graphical illustration for the model again in order to facilitate 
our understanding in the model setup. 
Freeflow Buyers^s. 
广 结 、 
I High type j Low type 
H \ Buyers I Buyers j l 
‘ Private Housing \ / Public Housing \ 
H" i ) I [bL«sL] ) … 
乂 Centralized 
夕 planning 
High typeselleis (#’ n") Low typesellets (凌，H^) 
Figure 4 - Graphical illustration of model in short run 
Appeared like the conventional supply and demand analysis, we cannot only focus on the 
long run situation and what's more important is that we have to know how the policy 
affects the market in short term. If we come back to our model, the situation in short run 
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is captured by fixing both the values of S ,S . The reason behind is that the number 
of sellers cannot vary in such a short time. "Rome was not built in one day." Especially 
houses, unlike the ordinary consumption commodities, were built over certain years of 
construction work. Since it is taking the sellers a long time to provide a unit of housing, it 
is not difficult to argue the numbers of sellers are being a constant in short term，thus 
一 H 一 L 
S ,S . The argument leads us to the system of equations below. Provided that values 
of S' are given, the values of market tightness would be determined. Therefore, only 
by solving the following two equations, we will know how the short run situation 
operates. 
e" (Eqn. 24) 
V - - - + J 
(9" = ( 1 -沪 5 ^ " ) / s" (Eqn. 45) 
Total differentiate the two equations, we can obtain 
(-h'"de"+dd^= h^'^dQ" + hQLdQL士f/^彻H千f/^dcL+hPHdpH+hPLdpL I 
^ ~s"d9" + - e"ds" - e^ds' > 
、 — 
Arrange it as a system of equations in matrix form, and therefore we have 
_ - / / ' 1 Ide"'^ 
、 卞 " + 「 卞 + [ 叫 + K . V + [ + [ 
0 0 0 0 0 J l _ 0 � （_-沪」 L—没」 
Perform the comparative static by Cramer's rule, a standard way to determine how the 
variables move at the equilibrium level. First of all, determinant should be solved first. 
A\=-h' S -S 
-ZL , gH IS 




6.2. Results of Comparative Static in Short Run 
Next, the comparative static can be studied under the system? Hereby, we tabulate the 
result as follows: 
9 The calculation is shown in the appendix 10.8 
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Table 4 - The comparative results of model in short run 
^ i P e F P F ^ ^ B^ B ^ 
二 I I : = - + + + 
SL I I ~ - - - - + + ~ I + ~ 
n " + I + - + - + + + ~ I ~ 
- + ~ - + - + + + - + 
I + ？ + ？ + - - -
cL + - + ？ + ~ ？ + + ~ + -
P " I + ？ + ？ + - - - + ~ 
+ I + ？ + ？ - I + ^ 
Note: 1."+" denotes the positive relationship for two variables, while " - " denotes the negative one."?" 
means the effect is ambiguous and "/" is indicated both variables involved no change. 
2. The variables on the first row are the endogenous variables whereas the leftmost column on 
the shows the exoqenouslv determined variables 
6.3. Discussions of the Model in Short Run 
The comparative static in short run is somehow straightforward to be interpreted. In this 
section, author endeavors to depict the relationships amongst the parameters individually. 
To begin with, let us compare how the values change of house owners in both markets 
affects the market parameters. 
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Figure 5 - The graphical illustration of the short-run equilibrium 
6.3.1. Change of Numbers of Sellers 
The change in numbers of sellers is negatively related to the market tightness in a 
particular market. The reason accounted for the change is that when the number of sellers 
increases in one of the markets, by definition (权'二 B”S ' )， j t will drift down its 
market tightness. The relatively low market tightness will attract the buyers from another 
market which in turn assuages the market tightness of the original market as well. 
The change of market tightness will further affect both sellers' values and market prices. 
Our model implies a sudden increase in the number of seller in public sector will cause 
the plummet of market price in both markets. With the price drop, the sellers' entry value 
is suppressed. 
The quantities of public housing are usually the government's concern in public housing 
policy. Even it is not the only factor contributing to the collapse of Hong Kong real estate 
market during the torturing period in 1998, but the policy is highly suspected to be an 
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accomplice in lengthening the prolonged suffering for every local property's owner. The 
reason is that those who want to enter the housing market choosing in between the public 
and private housing would definitely prefer the public flats. In short run, holding the total 
number of buyers being constant, more buyers purchase the public estates and thus drift 
away the buyers from the private market. 
Because of the large and fixed guaranteed housing supply of 85,000 policy, both markets 
were suffering in the price drop. Both markets become less tightened. Private developers 
as well as the public housing provider realized the entry value was shrinking and lose its 
confidence in entering the market. In fact, if the private developers dementedly expanded 
the number of flats sales, the similar consequence would be resulted like the 85,000 
policy. 
Proposition 6 In the competitive search model with exogenous inflow of buyers and 
sellers as well as no free entry, an increase in public housing units reduces the price 
and the market tightness for both sectors significantly. 
6.3.2. Change of House Owners' Value 
From the Table 4), we can see the value of a house owner (q ' ) is positively related to 
the market tightness {o') inside the particular types of housing {i = H,L)，whereas 
value of a house owner (q ' ) is negatively related to the market tightness in the 
alternative market. Here is the logic, say, when the value of being a public house owner 
rises, buyers' value therefore increases. Buyers from the private housing will be attracted 
and seek for the substitutes in the public housing sector. Just think on buyers' feet. If you 
can own a house with a higher value, you will go for it. That's why the market tightness 
in the public housing sector is tightened whereas the tightness is loosened in the private 
housing market. 
Followed the logical flow presented here, we can therefore explain why the value of 
sellers' entry value would be bid up in the public housing sector, while having a shrink of 
the seller's value in private housing sector. In fact, the model prediction closely parallels 
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to the reality. In former days, there was a fierce critic concerning the high quality of 
public estates crowded out the comparable quality of private properties in some particular 
regions. 
Furthermore, the increase of owners' value also boosts up the price in the corresponding 
market, while suppresses the housing price in the alternative market. The argument is 
obvious. Since your value of being a house owner is higher, the price that you are willing 
to pay should be higher as well. Whereas more owners from another market will enter the 
market to seek for their houses, it made the market less tightened for the alternative. 
We can here briefly relate the arguments to the reality. Provided the continuous 
improvement in quality, location and facilities of public housing, and the fact that certain 
flats even have superb sea view, rather than just being on a par with flats in the private 
sector in all aspects, HOS flats even compare favorably with their private sector 
counterparts. Furthermore, in addition to discounts and down payment waiver, buyers are 
also allowed to sell the HOS flats back to the Housing Authority a few years later at the 
original prices of the flats. All these special concessions have served to enable HOS flats 
to compete vigorously with private sector flats in the property market. The high quality of 
public housing crowds out the private estates, as we just mentioned in the previous 
sections, can be revealed in our model setup. At last, we can see the resulting situation is 
contradictory to the original intention of introducing the HOS, the most gravely affected 
victims are the some 300,000 owners of negative assets in private estates after the turmoil 
of financial crisis in 1997. 
Proposition 7 In the short run，the higher owner's value in the particular sector will 
tighten the sector and causes a higher housing price in the corresponding market, 
while leads an opposite effect onto its counterpart. 
6.3.3. Change of Search Cost 
Next, it comes to the effect on search cost. A costly search will assuage the market 
tightness, as people are less willing to bear such high cost in searching their home in that 
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particular market. As a result, people will be shifting to another market to search their 
houses as the searching cost in the counterpart is relatively lower than the original market. 
The idea can be applied for both markets. 
A higher search cost in one market also drives up the sellers' value and price of another 
market. The changes are simply due to the costly search drifted away the buyers from the 
market with relatively high search cost. However, there is an ambiguous effect of search 
cost on price and sellers' value in its own market. The ambiguity is owing to the positive 
effect of search cost on price being offset by the negative effect of search cost on its 
market tightness. 
Having a deeper understanding of determinants contributing to the waiting costs can 
allow us to get more familiar with the model setup. To buyers in private housing, the 
waiting costs are usually the costs they have to pay if the purchase of the house is delayed, 
for instance, the rent in leasing a house. Besides, the expectation of a rising nominal price 
in real estates can also be regarded as an important component as the waiting costs, since 
they have to pay more if they purchase later. When it comes to expectation, 
business-cycle may affect the waiting costs of the buyers in both markets as well. 
To the buyers in public housing, the most obvious cost would indeed the duration of 
waiting time. Since public housings are provided on a basis of lottery and there are in fact 
having long queue in the market. Usually, on average a family of four would need to wait 
at least three years in order to purchasing a public estate. The prolonged waiting process 
is highly related to the rationale of 85,000 housing policy at which we can see how it 
exerted a negative impact on the markets in the model. Before the period of financial 
turmoil, the housing price is condemned to be extremely high and even regarded as a 
bubble. To tackle the problem, the government under Chief Executive Tung Chee-Hwa 
implemented the 85,000 housing policy which attempted to stabilize the housing market 
by supplying more houses. The policy encountered an unprecedented failure which can 
be reviewed in our model setup. 
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85,000 housing policy certainly reduces the waiting cost of the buyers in public housing 
sector. If the search cost of public housing faces a sudden drop, more people would prefer 
to buy the public housing. Thus the policy greatly tightens the market tightness in public 
sector. While at the same time, the private housing sector encounters a plummet in its 
number of buyers which definitely push down the price of the house. Here we cannot 
conclude the price of public housing would be benefited, but no matter it changes the 
price or not, the fact is that the private housing is negatively affected by the policy. 
6.3.4. Change of Bargaining Power of Sellers 
The bargaining power of sellers will alter the market tightness. Since buyers will choose 
to enter the market where the sellers are weaker in the bargaining procedure, the change 
of bargaining power of sellers is negatively related to the market tightness. The stronger 
sellers are; fewer buyers will enter the market. 
Naturally followed, if the bargaining power of sellers is higher, the number of buyers in 
that particular market would be reduced and it also leads to an increase of buyers in 
another market. 
For the price change, we know that the bargaining power of sellers in one market 
increases will drive away the buyers to seek for another market, thus the market tightness 
of the original market will be loosened while tighter in another. As for the price, it shows 
an ambiguous effect in the former market. The ambiguity is due to two opposite effects. 
First, the lower market tightness pushed down the price, whereas second is owing to the 
higher bargaining power is favorable to set a higher price. 
Say, if private developers can monopolize in price, most buyers would prefer to buy the 
public housing. The increase of demand in public housing bids up the price, while the 
price of private market depends on two forces. One is the positive effect from bargaining 
whereas the negative effect of fewer buyers in the market suppressing the price. Thus, the 
effect is ambiguous. 
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7. Discussions 
Every government regulation is supposed being planned on behalf of social well being, 
but most often it becomes an evil to the society. One of the reasons accounted for such 
evil doings is coined as the concept of unintended consequences. Unintended 
consequences refer to situations where an action results in an outcome that is not, or not 
merely, what individuals intended. The unintended results, if not put it under a vigorous 
analysis and keep track with the logic behind the unintended outcomes, the concept 
persists only as a solemn warning against certain disorder, and therefore no useful 
implication can be derived from the concept. 
This paper is trying to set an example how we can avoid the unintended consequences of 
policy making in public housing by incorporated the consideration of time horizon. To 
put the paper briefly, it attempts to show why the 85,000 housing policy implemented by 
the HKSAR government in the year of 1997 encountered remarkable failure. The reason 
is that the policy makers only take the long run influences as the basis in designing the 
policy, while totally ignore the short run effect in the market. 
When we design a policy, we have to beware there shall be some unexpected result. In 
other words, each cause has more than one influences which perhaps unforeseeable if we 
only evaluate policies with only a particular perspective. This situation often arises 
because a policy has a perverse incentive and causes actions contrary to what is desired. 
In fact, such concept of unintended consequence is one of the building blocks of 
economics. Adam Smith's invisible hand is an example of a positive unintended 
consequence. Adam Smith maintained that each individual, seeking only his own gain, is 
led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention, which the 
end being the public interest. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, or the baker, 
(who) we expect our dinner," Smith continued, "but from regard to their own self interest. 
Besides the prosperity that we enjoyed with the invisible hand, there are many other 
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examples showing how the positive unintended consequences change our world. Another 
controversial research carried out by Donohue and Levitt (2001) suggests that legalized 
abortion in the United States has accounted for as much as 50% of the drop in national 
crime rates. As evidence, Donohue and Levitt cite the fact that states that legalized 
abortion before Roe v. Wade saw correspondingly earlier drops in crime, and that states 
where abortion is common saw greater drops in crime than states where abortion is rare. 
Most convincingly, they found that in high abortion states, only arrests of those born after 
abortion legalization fall relative to low abortion states. That's also an example of benefit 
attained from the unintended consequences of abortion law. 
Yet, unintended consequences can result an adverse effect in many issues. The reality 
tells us government policies often do much harm than good in the market because of the 
unintended consequences. The concept of unintended consequences can serves us as the 
foundation for many criticisms of government regulations. For example, many social 
security programs have launched of aiming at alleviating poverty among senior citizens, 
however, the program per se has carried a cost that goes beyond the payroll taxes levied 
on workers and employers. Martin Feldstein, the chairman of National Bureau of 
Economic Research, criticized that today's workers save less for their old age because 
they know they will receive social security checks when they retire. If Feldstein is correct, 
it means that less savings are available, less investment takes place, and the economy, 
and wages, grow more slowly than there is no extensive social security. 
As you can see from this paper, it is another example to illustrate the unintended 
consequences involved in housing policy. Author wants to show how the unsophisticated 
policy planning could ruin the vision that a policy maker intended. Of course, as long as 
the unanticipated outcomes are realized, they are hard to predict; however, once we 
realized, we must do our best to uncover the reasons beneath and attempt to avoid the bad 
consequences in advance. That's why when you read this paper; you can see how a 
housing policy failed because the policy makers couldn't realize the short run catastrophic 
havoc overrides the long run benefit, or shortly speaking - they ignore the time horizon of 
implementing the policies. Hence, one of the major contributions of the paper is to 
5 3 
highlight the time horizon does really a matter for constituting a policy. 
Inferred from the proposition 1 and 5，we can obviously see that the rise of public 
housing unit suppresses the housing price in short run while leaving the long run housing 
price unaffected. We can thus conclude that a blindly expansion of public housing will 
ruin both housing markets in short run, regardless of private or public sectors. Even the 
increase in the number of public housing unit doesn't affect the long run market attributes, 
but one thing we have to beware is that the short run situation may last long for a 
relatively long period in the housing market where houses' value involve a significant 
proportion of wealth for most of the individuals. The short run impact has already been a 
huge effect onto the society. 
8. Concluding Remarks and Further Extensions 
Most studies of housing economics analyze the private housing in accordance with 
providing a detail explanation on topics like, the housing price dispersion; real estate 
prices pattern prediction, building production, and real estate consumption in the classical 
paradigm. Besides, the rising importance of housing market towards the macroeconomic 
development also triggers many intensive studies on the real estate market. Relatively 
little in the literature, however, has been focused on the public housing sector which is 
most likely an essential sector within the real estate market. This paper seeks to fill the 
gap in the literature. Hopefully this paper can be a contribution in raising the attention 
amongst the researchers in housing economics where public housing sector should be 
considerably undertaken as a focal point for any real estate market studies. 
Further work can be extended in both theoretical and empirical approach. Concerning the 
framework per se, the model is depicted as a monolog in the linear fashion. The beauty of 
the model, of course, can employ the simplest model with fewest assumptions to account 
for the phenomenon in the housing market in which public housing is mature; however, 
the model may be criticized as the static model which may not be adequate to fully 
5 4 
account the dynamic in the housing market. Further complication could be made in 
changing the static linear model into the dynamic one which insofar as my concern, the 
results would be more or less the same. 
For empirical analysis, the proposition about the quality of public housing claimed in the 
model are hypothetically testable and the empirical results of the proposition can further 
yield the policy implication with the data support. Will more high quality of the public 
housing in the market, more people prefer public to private housing? 
Besides, further empirical study concerning how the public and private housing 
investment interact with each other are undergoing seriously with VAR approach. Such 
extension can enrich our acquaintance of the public housing market and its interactions 
with the private housing market]� 
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10. Appendix 
10.1. Various Subsidized Housing Scheme in Hong Kong 
10.1.1. The Tenant Purchasing Scheme (TPS) 
In 1998, the Tenant Purchase Scheme (TPS) was allowed the existing tenants to purchase 
their rental units over a 10-year period. The sale of public rental housing at the handsome 
discounted price although boosted up the market demand for housing; eradicated most 
incentive of prospective TPS to purchase their houses from the private housing sector. 
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How the large supply of new HOS units competed with the private housing market can 
essentially reflected in the dramatic drop in the number of successful Green From 
applicants for HOS units after the year of 1997. In 1997, there was still 74% of the new 
HOS units were sold to Green From applicants, while in 2001 While Form applicants 
took almost 78% of HOS units. 
10.1.2. The Home Purchase Loan Scheme (HPLS) 
Prior to the HPLS, the loan could be only applied for the purchase of private housing 
units. Under the HPLS, households can grant the loans from HPLS to purchase houses in 
the HOS secondary market. 
10.1.3. Eligibility of HOS scheme 
T a b l e 5 - El ig ib i l i ty cr i ter ia for H o n g K o n g H o u s i n g Author i ty H o m e O w n e r s h i p S c h e m e 
Type of Applications 
Eligibility Criteria "11 
Green Form Applicants (Note 1) White Form Applicants (Note 2) 
1. Housing Authority (HA)/ Housing Society 1. Families living in private sector 
(HS) public rental housing (PRH) estate housing. 
domestic flat tenants and authorized 2. Families who wish to live apart 
occupants of the HA's interim housing (IH). from the present households in 
2. Holders of valid Green Form Certificate. the HA and the HS PRH estates, 
They include : IH managed by the HA. 
a) Waiting List applicants; 3. Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS) 
b) Clearees and disaster victims; flat owners (within 10 years from 
c) Junior civil servants applying for PRH the date of assignment of the TPS 
under the Civil Service Public flat). 
,广‘ . , Housing Quota; 
1. Categories of d) PRH residents involving 
Applicants divorce/splitting; 
e) Urban Renewal Authority clearees. 
3. Prospective PRH tenants whose eligibility for 
PRH has been established under the Buy or 
Rent Option (BRO) Scheme. 
4. Staff of the Estate Assistant grade of the HD 
who are holding a valid Letter of Assurance 
issued by the HD. 
5. RAES recipients. 
f T T ~ ~ No income and asset limits. (Note 3) ||The total ^onthl^ y faiiiily income does 
2. Household Income not exceed $10,000 per month (single 
Iperson household ) or $20,000 
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(2-person or above household) and the 
total net family asset does not exceed 
$240,000 (single person household) or 
$480,000 (2-person or above 
household). The higher limits for the 
Waiting List will apply for the large 
households. (Note 4) 
No member of the family has, at any 
time within 24 months immediately 
prior to the closing date of application 
3. Property Ownership No property ownership restriction (Note 3) and before the purchase of a flat under 
the scheme, owned any domestic 
property. 
No length of residence restriction (Note 3) Prior to the closing date of application, 
the applicant or one of the family 
members listed in the application form 
has lived in Hong Kong for not less 
4. Length of Residence than seven years and has been 
permitted to stay in Hong Kong 
unconditionally (except for a condition 
on the limit of stay). 
一 5. Applicant's Age ] | At least 18 years of age |[ (Note 5) 
A single person includes unmarried person, 
divorcee, widow/widower and married person 
whose spouse does not have the right to land in 
Hong Kong. For this purpose, a person having the 
right to land with any condition of stay (except a 
, r .. ^ condition on the limit of stay) shall not be 
6. Family Composition regarded as having the right to land in Hong Kong. ^^ote 7) 
(Note 5) 
As a household, the applicant and his/her family 
members must be related and live together. (Note 
6) 
Note ： 
1. Successful applicants have to surrender their existing flats or public housing eligibility. 
2. Successful applicants who are TPS flat owners have to sell their existing TPS flats back to the HA 
or in the HOS Secondary Market. 
3. Applicants using Green Forms by holding Green Form Certificates and eligible applicants under 
the BRO still have to meet the income /asset limits, family composition, length of residence and 
domestic property ownership restriction at the time of purchasing home ownership flats. 
4. The revised income and asset limits were approved on 31 August 2002 vide HA Home Ownership 
Committee paper 45/2002. 
5. Single applicants are allowed to purchase flats of any size, but their priority in flat selection will 
be lower than that of family applicants. 
6. The priority of the eligible ordinary Green Form applicants will be upgraded to third priority 
status if they opt to join the Priority Scheme for Families with Elderly Members. 
7. White Form applicants from nuclear families who opt to join the Priority Scheme for Families 
with Elderly Members will have their White Form status upgraded to Ordinary Green Form status. 
Source: Hong Kong Housing Authority. (2003). Hong Kong Housing Authority 2002/2003 Annual Report. 
Hong Kong: Hong Kong Housing Authority, Appendix 6B, pp. 112-113. 
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Eligibility Criteria for Hong Kong Housing Authority Home Loans and HOS Secondary Market 
Scheme (2002 -2003) 
T Y P E OF APPLICATIONS 
^Crite'ria^ G R E E N FORM APPLICANTS ( N OTE 1) WHITE FORM APPLICANTS (NOTE 2) 
1. HA/HS estate domestic flat tenants, 1. Families or single persons living in private sector 
authorized occupants of the HA's IH, and housing. 
recipients of the RAES. 
2. Families or single persons who wish to live apart 
2. Holders of valid Green Form from the present households in HA and HS estates, and IH 
J Certificate. They include: managed by the HA. 
Categories a) Waiting List applicants; 
� f 5 b) Clearees and disaster victims; 3. TPS flat owners. (Note 3) 
Applicants c) Junior civil servants applying for the 
Civil Service Public Housing Quota; 
d) PRH residents involving 
divorce/splitting; 
e) Domestic tenants affected by 
projects of the Urban Renewal Authority. 
No income and asset limits for category 1 Home Purchase Loan Scheme (HPLS) (Note 4) 
applicants. Total family income not exceeding $12,500 (single person) 
or $25,000 (2 to 8 persons) or $26,600 (9 persons) or 
Category 2 applicants have to fulfil the $28,400 (10 persons or more), 
income and asset limits as set out in the 
respective Green Form Certificate. (Note 5) Total household net asset value not exceeding $300,000 
(Note 6) (single person) or $600,000 (2 to 6 persons) or $610,000 (7 
2 persons) or $630,000 (8 persons) or $660,000 (9 persons) or 
Household $680,000 (10 persons or more). 
In^o^e Home Assistance Loan Scheme (HALS) 
^ . sset Total family income not exceeding $11,500 (single person) 
Limits or $23,000 (2 to 8 persons) or $23,400 (9 persons) or 
$25,000 (10 persons or more). 
Total household net asset value not exceeding $240,000 
(single person) or $480,000 (2 to 5 persons) or $500,000 (6 
persons) or $540,000 (7 persons) or $560,000 (8 persons) or 
$620,000 (9 persons) or $680,000 (10 persons or more) 
No domestic property ownership restriction No member of the family has, at any time within 24 months 
for category 1 applicants. immediately prior to the date of application, owned any 
3 Domestic local domestic property, 
p Category 2 applicants have to fulfil the 
O P I . domestic property ownership restriction as 
P set out in the respective Green Form 
Certificate. (Note 7) (Note 6) 
No length of residence restriction for At least one family member must have lived in Hong Kong 
category 1 applicants. for not less than seven years on or before the date of 
submission of the application form, and his/her stay in Hong 
4. Length of Category 2 applicants have to fulfil the Kong is not subject to any conditions of stay (except for 
Residence length of residence restriction as set out in conditions concerning the limit of stay), 
the respective Green Form Certificate. 
(Note 8) (Note 6) 




6. Single person or at least 2 persons' Single person or at least 2 related persons. 
Household household composition. 
Composition 
Note ： 
1. Successful applicants have to surrender their existing flats or forfeit their rent allowance/public 
housing eligibility. 
2. Not applicable to HOS Secondary Market Scheme. 
3. Eligibility criteria same as category 1 Green Form applicants. 
4. The HPLS was closed to application in January 2003. 
5. The Green Form Certificate applicants with rental housing eligibility have to satisfy the 
income/asset limits of the Waiting List. For those without rental housing eligibility, the 
income/asset limits of the HPLS/HALS will apply. 
6. The restrictions on the household income/asset/domestic property ownership/length of residence 
are still applicable until at the date prior to signing of the Provisional Agreement for Sale and 
Purchase/Agreement for Sale and Purchase (whichever is the earlier) to purchase a property after 
the issue of Approval-in-principle under the HPLS/HALS or signing the Provisional Agreement 
for Sale and Purchase to purchase a Secondary Market flat. 
7. The Green Form Certificate applicants and all family members with rental housing eligibility, 
must not own any domestic property in Hong Kong from the date of application. For those without 
rental housing eligibility, they must not own any domestic property in Hong Kong at any time 
within 24 months immediately prior to the date of application. 
8. Applicant or one of the family members must have lived in Hong Kong for not less than seven 
years on or before the date of submission of the application form, and his/her stay in Hong Kong is 
not subject to any conditions of stay (except for conditions concerning the limit of stay). 
Source: Hong Kong Housing Authority. (2003). Hong Kong Housing Authority 2002/2003 Annual Report. 
Hong Kong: Hong Kong Housing Authority, Appendix 6C, pp. 114-115. 
10.1A "85,000 Housing Policy” in Hong Kong 
The content of the policy was listed on the policy address 1997 section 3 "Home for 
Hong Kong". Parts of the policies are highlighted as references. 
• Inc rease supp ly o f land and bui ld suppor t ing infras t ructure to ensure tha t the target of 
cons t ruc t ing at least 85 ,000 f la ts a yea r wil l be met . 
• S t r e a m l i n e g o v e r n m e n t p rocedu re s to speed up the supply o f land. 
_ Sell 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 publ ic rental f la ts to t enan t s over the next 10 years , and o f f e r success fu l 
app l i can t s for pub l ic rental h o u s i n g the opt ion to buy H o m e O w n e r s h i p S c h e m e f lats . 
• 6 , 0 0 0 f ami l i e s to benef i t each y e a r f r o m a new " H o m e Star ter" loan s cheme , p rov id ing 
loans o f abou t $ 6 0 0 , 0 0 0 fo r each el igible fami ly over the next f i ve years . 
• Inc rease the n u m b e r o f f la ts to be sold and rented to wai t ing list appl icants to mee t 
t a rge t wa i t i ng t ime o f 3 yea r s by 2 0 0 5 . 
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• Establish an Urban Renewal Authority by 1999; implement the Mandatory Building 
Safety Scheme and set up a $500 million 
• Rehabilitation Fund to provide assistance to owners to undertake inspection and 
remedial works. 
10.2. Nash Bargaining Solution 
The Nash Bargaining solution is solved by the equation: 
= F ' ) + ( l - i 3 ' ) n ' 
Based on the equation 
f i \ 
V fi 'J 
We can equate both equations 
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The concept of Nash bargaining solution is adopted here because the rationale behind the 
setup is desirable to capture the price determination procedure in a housing unit 
transaction. In a housing purchase transaction, when the seller and the buyer value a 
housing unit differently, a surplus is created. A bargaining solution is then a way in 
which buyers and sellers agree to divide the surplus. 
For example, consider a house made by a builder A. It costs him Rs.lO Lacs. A potential 
buyer is interested in the house and values it at Rs.20 Lacs. This transaction can generate 
a surplus of Rs.lO Lacs. The builder and the buyer now need to trade at a price. The 
buyer knows that the cost is less than 20 Lacs and the seller knows that the value is 
greater than 10 Lacs. The two of them need to agree at a price. Both try to maximize their 
surplus. Buyer would want to buy it for 10 Lacs, while the seller would like to sell it for 
20 Lacs. They bargain on the price, and either trade or dismiss. Trade would result in the 
generation of surplus, whereas no surplus is created in case of no-trade. Bargaining 
Solution provides an acceptable way to divide the surplus among the two parties. 
11 Assume that bargaining set X is convex and bounded. 
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Formally, a Bargaining Solution is defined as, 
F : (X，d) — S， 
where X c R^ and S，d g R^. X represents the utilities of the players in the set of possible 
bargaining agreements, d represents the point of disagreement. 
In the above example, price e [10,20], bargaining set is simply x + y < 10, x > 0, y > 0. A 
point (x,y) in the bargaining set represents the case, when seller gets a surplus of x, and 
buyer gets a surplus of y, i.e. seller sells the house at 10 + x and the buyer pays 20 — y. 
i k 
^ Bargaining Set 
Player 2's utility \ > / 
Player I's utility 
Figure 6 - Bargaining Set 
10.3. The Pricing Function in the Private Housing Market p" 
p" = f i + ^ V ' ' 
V 
From this equation, we can infer that P " is decreasing in 妒 and increasing in 
12 Source: Kumar, M. & Chaudhary，T. (2002). Nash Bargaining Solutions. Retrieved March 17, 2008 
from Indian Institute o f Technology, Delhi, The Department of Computer Science and Engineering Web 
site: hltp://\v\vwxsejitdxTnct.in/-~rahul/cs905/lcclurcl5/index.htnil 
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n " . 
10.4. The Pricing Function in the Public Market p^ 
By the equation pL .we have: 
10.5. The Market Tightness of Private Market 0" 
The market tightness in private market is relatively easier to be determined. We 




rn" M[e\\) e" 
From the solution, we can see the market tightness in the private market is decreasing in 
c^, and while increasing in n " . 
The intuition in the function would be in this way. The higher owners' value in the market 
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would attract more buyers into the market. Price is therefore bid up. More sellers come 
and override the increase of buyers in the market. As a result, an increase in owners' 
value lowers the market tightness in the private housing market. 
The higher search cost is, the more buyers leave the market and hence lower the market 
tightness is. The higher bargaining power of sellers lead the buyers leave the market as 
well, thus market tightness decreases. 
0H =®H(nH,cH,广,fi"� 
V - - - + J 
10.6. The Market Tightness of Public Housing Market G^  
By V" = we have 
-c" + 一/7"(.，.）] -cL + _PH.，.)] 
ri" + r rj^ +r 
M{\,\/e^) + r = -c�7?气QL代，.)] 
M{\,\/e") + r = —+ — ；7"(.，.）] 
M(0"，1) + 泊 " = - c " 6 l " + M(6>"’l)[r2"—;7"(.,.)] 
Divided all terms by M{0', 1 )，we get 
1 +"M(1，1/"乙） = l + r / M ( l， l / 0 
一 c i / M ( l ’ l / 0 勺 + -/(.’•)] = -c"/M{\,\/e") + [Q"-p"{.,.)] 
Since 
Let F ^ be the L.H.S. and F " be the R.H.S. of the equation; besides partially consider 
: [Notethat ( 厂 = 們 ] 
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… 1) + + 
= p ： ::r 
Divide both numerator and denominator by 
= ^ ^ - 7 ^ T 
The denominator is positive by the assumption that [^^丄-pi(.，-)] > 0 ，since the 
owners' value should be greater than the price paid or otherwise buyers will not purchase 
the house. 
For notational simplicity, let Y be the value of the denominator, 
L p'-o'' ^ oL J p'- J and thus we have: 
[M{d\\) + + c^) 
Y 
=七 |£Vt「"frM^�1) + M ( 0 � 障 ’ 1) + + 
/ |_ pLQL 乂 乂 p L � J 
= 4 ^ < [ n V � 1 ) + M(0L，1) f 1 - 去 ） + " iz - 1) - — "I - c'M{e\\)-c'r> 
Y [ |_ p^e^ V e ^ j p ^ � J 
X is increasing in and hence, F^ is decreasing in Q^. 
To address the change of in ’ we again use the same trick to keep track of 
the signs: By V" = V^ 
\ + rlM{\,\l9') _ \^rlM{\Me") 
+ 一；/(.，.)] — -c" /M(l,l/沒"）+ | Q " 
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Since in the previous section, we know that P^ is increasing in thus X is 
decreasing in and therefore 厂乙 is increasing in f^^-
Let F ^ be the L.H.S. and F ^ be the R.H.S. of the equation; besides partially consider 
X is decreasing in and hence, F^ is increasing in p^ 
Further summarize the results would be as follows: 
F" = 
V + - + + J 
The signs are worked by the following total derivatives: 
d0' _ aF^ / d F ' r ) = 一 ML / Q 
ee" d9' dcL dcL ee^ 
+ + + + 
do^ — dF" ！ dpL ^ A deL _ dF" / d p L � A 
— de' w 一 
+ + + 
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de' _ dF'! dF^-�n ^ = - ^ / i l L < 0 
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10.7. The Comparative Statics in Long Run 
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- \ + + - y + \ + + - / 
dcL ^ eeL dc'�” 
- - + -
dsL doL de" . A d ^ j E i j e l ^ n 
dn" eeL eeH ^^H ？“ 
- + + + + + 
f \ f \ 
M!lM!L > 0 ML MLM!L < q 
叩 I d p " � � u eeL、谢"dp"厂” 
dsjiML^ 0 0 
着 dp' dOL dpL�” 
” - _ + -
db / / 
daL + + 
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/ dB" dS" dpH dpL 
们H K K < 0 0 0 dpL f eel seL 80h� 
+ - - - - - + V - + - / 
dpL dP'- de^ ^ A 
cIQL / / / t u 
+ + + 
_ K K < 0 ap^ f ee'- ^  89'-
dc" deH dcH" ee" dc" do" dc" 、 + 一 ？ 
+ _ - - - - + 乂+ + - y 
dpL , dpL 50乙=9 
dcL I / / dcL 十 dOL Q^L-. 
+ + 
dB" d0H ss" de" ^ 0 + = ？ iELMLMH�q 
+ + + + - + + + + 
dB" de" ^ c\ 的H seH Q dpH J , 
dpH doH 印H> U ee" 8pH> ” f r ！r < 0 
+ - - + V + - J 
dpL , dpL dpL 二 9 
dB^ / / / dpL deL dpL 一 . 
+ + -
db + + / / 
da' - - / / 
7 3 
10.8. Comparative Statics in Short Run Equilibrium 
Consider the housing market in short run where 9'' is a function of market tightness 
QH and also of an exogenously determined variables CV ’c' ,r' ,jB' • The 6" , on 
the other hand, is a function of and the given value S and S . 
+ + - + - 乂 
In drawing the usual type of two dimensional relationships between O" and , 
the level of exogenous variables are assumed to be fixed. When every exogenously 
determined variables changes, it will upset a given equilibrium with the change of the 
parameters. The whole procedure of comparative static analysis will be concerned with 
how a change in exogenously determined variables Q',c',j3' affects the equilibrium 
position ,0^) of the model. 
Despite the equations cannot be solved explicitly for the equilibrium market tightness 
9 \ we shall argue there exists a static equilibrium (Moen 1997) and by total 
differentiating the two equations, we can obtain 
+d0' = h"""dClH +f/'dc" +h�cL L� 
Arrange it as a 2 by 2 system of equation in matrix form, and therefore we have: 
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“-A"" 1 i r cw" _ 
s"梦[_ = 
— 叫 「 叫 叫 叫 , c � 「 叫 卜 卞 「 。 。 > 
0 � 0 � | _ 0 � | _ ° � 1 _ 0 � 0 -e" -el-
First of all, determinant should be solved. 
I ^ J 
< 0 
For 6\ we can simply work out the implicit function for 6 " and 炉 by 
applying the Cramer's rule, 
jK=_！_ > 0 差=~！~ < 0 
“ " " 卜 I 0 “ " " 卜 I -sH 0 
！ - 丄 乃 1 < 0 丄 # > 0 
- 「 卜 丨 0 -sL j 丨 r 0 
！二丄！1 < 0 皇=丄 
1 ^ 1 0 -SL " c " 卜 I -SH 0 
. � o 品 - 1 V < 0 
0 -sL r � < � 
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f - 丄 , \ < 0 f - 丄 � 0 
" 广 卜 I 0 y " 广 卜 I -sH 0 > � 
差 - 丄 \ >0 丄 … < 0 
" 厂 I j I 0 炉 " " 广 I j I r 0 
差 = _ ! _ 0 1 < 0 丄 0 
d-S"卜 I -SL K I r 
！=丄 0— 1 <0 差 = 丄 0 _ <0 
From comparative static above, we can write the equilibrium 9" and 
implicitly in term of follows: 
¥ = 硕 ， c \ pH，P^S"梦、 
V - + - - + _ + - - / 
V - - + + - + - - -乂 
Furthermore, with the equations shown in short run, we have 
VH = vH(0H.,nH,cH’pH�11" = g j V ^ l V ^ c " ， P " = p ^ ^ ( p A 
V - + - - J V + + + + J V + + + - + J 
f \ f \ f \ 
V^ = vM 0L.’Q\c�pL n ^ = g dL;nL’cL,r,pL pL 二^L 
V - + - - J \ + + + - + y V + + + - + J 
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/ dn" duL dpH dpL 
du" . du" ^ ^^ A an^ ^ n ^ , a � n ^ ^ ^ ^ 
ciQH XlH 十硬 ” eP^ dQH�u " ^ 十 u 
+ + + + + + + + 
dn" ^ A iOi , a n 乙涵 � n dp" ^ ^ , ^ 
cKlL dQt 十 e^ d^L, y •^十 
+ + + + + + + + 
du" . du" 7 miLM^�0 ^ + 办 " 7 _^ 里、o 
dc" dcH 卞 ^ dcH— • 涵 dcH Z dcH 卞 ^ dcH— . ^ dc"^ ^ 
+ + - + + + + - + + 
gn^ ^ A ani , an^ 9 dp" ^ ^ 妃 dp'- ^ _ ^ 
dcL dcL 十涵 dcL- . ^ dc' " dcL 卞涵 dcL_ . 
+ + + + - + + + + _ 
ds" ^ ds" ^ ds" d^dr ^ ds" ^ 
+ — + - + - + -
, an" ^ z n mi见,n n n 
d_SL ' ^ I F ^ dS' dSL� 
+ 一 + - + + -
dn" , an"硬二 9 涵、0 ^ .郎"g ? ? 二 ^ dp'- ^ 
dp" 十 j dpH—. 涵 dp"? u dpH 卞硬 dpH-. 涵 dpH? ” 
+ + - + + + + - + + 
dn" dP^ A i n i 4. dn'-涵二 9 H � A ^ , 办 � 9 
dp^ u dpL 卞涵 dpL- • ^ dp'' dpL 卞 fL epi- • 
+ + + + - + + + + -
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/ dV" dVL 
+ - + * _ 
_ - + _ + * 
dV" , dv" nf^ A\ dV^ ^ . Ci 
dc" + ？ « 0) 0 
- - - • _ + 
dv" ^^ 0 ml 4. ？(S m 
_ _ _ _ * 
dv" ^ ^ A dy'dF A 
d? ^ ds" ^ ds" 
S " � 0 尝》0 
df^ dv" ^ _ ？广,⑴ 呈，A 
dp" a^a严-•(〈…* 涵耶 
— 一 一 — + 
dV" ^ ^ A ^ , dV^ 9 / . 0〉 
- + - - * 
(*Note: The sign in the blanket is signed in the light of satisfying the equality V ^ = V ^ . ) 
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For B" = For B^ = O^S^ 
dB" :dB" ee" ^ A mL dpL ^ 
da" — de" XI" dn" 一谢丄 
+ + + -
M l — dB" ee" ^ A M L ^ M L M L ^ 0 
dnL ~de"dQ'- dnL m'-do.^ 
+ + + 
dB" dB" de" < A MML = dB'- dpL 0 
dc"—谢L dc" ^ 
+ + + 
dB" dB" de". A ^ 0 
dc' 一 dOL d广 U 
+ + + -
„ ^ U -^H dB'- — gfl�朋乙 z n 
^ 0 . M L M L > 0 
斤 d S L * dSL 一 0 + eeL 汤L > U 
dB" _dB" de" . r. ml :朋'dpL 0 
• ^ - • ^ " ^ � U cipH _ dOL ” 
+ - + + 
Ml -M!LM!L�0 ML =MLML� q 
dpL, u dp'' doL Qpi 
+ + + -
Note : * 
dB" dB" de" 仙 L _ I 油L ee'' 
万 + „ d f 卯、〒“ 
B" ( e" \ _ “ � 
* ^Note : ~s"de" + 梦deL= 0 ^ = 
10.9. What the Relationship between p' and 9' ？ 
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We may think it in this way, 
尸 ,—jr 'Q ' + cQ 輝'•，1) + r']p' 
—？ [ ( l - i 3 ' . ) M ( l ， ^ ) + j 8 ' . M ( 0 '， l ) + r'.:-
— + cQ _ '， l ) + r '] 
一 — [(1 一 + r ' ] + P'[M(e', 1) + 
Divided both numerators and denominator by the numerator 
户,=P'(r'Q' + cO 1 
r' (i-/)'_)M(i’古)+— 
~ + B' 
[Mi9',l)+r'] “ 
in which P ‘ is increasing in 0'. 
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10.10. Flow Chart of the Interactions between Markets 
10.10.1. The Long Run Model 
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二 VL(/)’ pL(/) 
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Figure 8 - The change of buyers' inflow 
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_ ( h n V ^ ( n H < n " ) ~ • sH 办 ( t i i i n H = n " ) 
\ J r 
‘ I I I 
eH介 n"介：^pH分 
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B"办 B " 分 9 H 介 
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bl介：^eL分 I ql^S*-办VL办pL介 
Figure 9 - The change of reservation value of sellers in private market 
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^ ^ ^ 
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“ (by QH^^  & eH 則 9 ^ S D V ^ P ^ 
Figure 10 - The change of owners' value in private housing market 
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� Q L 分 ) ^ nL 分，pL� 
^ f 
=> V^ 1> ( v S v " ) With 
bl 介 �M(BL，SL)分sL 办。eL 介 
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Figure 11 - The change of owners* value in public housing market 
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： p H分 — > s^i>(tii i 
I . 
eH办 
lO vH 介(V">V )^ v "分 ( b y 9H 办） 
_ 9 bL ^^  till (V"=V^) _ • 
doesn't affect V^&e" ) 
B "介 ( by E"办） indirect effect B " 办 办 二 pH仓 
^ SH 介=> M ( B " , S " ) i> B " -0- _ ^ (Effect on change in seller 
dominates - P ^ is more 
sensitive to sellers' change) 
B L 凸 0 L 办 
Since, e^ J^-
办=:>SLl> 
r=>VL介 _ _ • eL化 SL介，VL介,pL办 
二 p L � 
Figure 12 - The change of bargaining power of sellers in private housing market 
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( e ••分） J nLi>,pL介 
V y 
> r 
=> v ^ ^ ( V ^ < V " ) With B ^ ^ 
b^^ 二 m sL 办 : 介 
till ( V ^ = V " ) • 二 v L 办 
( b y P L分）direct effect B ^ ^ ：=> ^ 
— B L 分 ( b y e * - ^ ) indirect effect _ ^ (direct effect dominates) 
sellers' effect 
，r 
b H d ( b y p L 介） e ^ ^ => i i H II^SL 分 
^ b " ^ ^ ( b y e " ( / ) => v L * ( / ) 
=>pL 办 
y r 
B " ( / ) P " ( / ) S ' ^ ( / ) V " ( / ) 
N o t e : •V '^ i s u n a f f e c t e d , s ince V " = 
Figure 13 - The change of bargaining power of sellers in public housing market 
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/ \ — — 
cHi> nH 分（nH>n") s"分（till n H = n " ) 
cH 介 e " ^ =>v"? 
B " B ^ ^ r>H^ ^ r L n Direct effect dominates 
厂 (tillvW) till — vH<>(bycH 介） 
训（V - V ) Indirect effect dominsates 
V"介（by e" H') 
B"^!' (by ) BH 办 办 。 p H 分 
(Direct effect dominates) 
S" !>=> M(B" ,S") ？ =>B" undetermined 
I BL 办二 M(BL,SL)办=> SL 介 � e L 办 I I L. p L . ~ ~ 
^ b l 介： m ( b l ， s l ) 介。 s l 办 - e L 介 — ^ e ? s - ? v ? p ? 
1 r I 
Case (i) direct effect dominates Case (ii) indirect effect dominates 
B'-i> =>eL 介 bl 办=>eL 办 
Since, Q^ll Since, e*-^ 
=> pL => pL 
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